Chad Lawhorn | April 15th, 2023 

Energy Security Strategy and Transition in the Federal Republic of Germany

An Overview of German Energy Security

Energy security is a complex mosaic of concepts and topics that impact every facet of society. Creating and executing a robust energy security agenda depends on various factors, including political, geographic, economic, environmental, geopolitical, and social considerations. A robust energy security strategy is critical for any country's stability and economic health, but developing and implementing such a strategy can be challenging for some governments (Dannreuther, 2017).   

The German Government has established an ambitious energy security strategy and is determined to meet its goals. Germany continues to advance an energy agenda focused on renewable energy goals (Appunn et al., 2023; BMWK, 2021 and 2022a; European Commission, 2019). However, German policymakers have a challenging road ahead (Botsford, 2022; Fokuhl & Sorge, 2023).

Germany is focused on reducing its dependence on Russian energy products while increasing the use of renewable energy sources. The German Government's energy security strategy is driven by geopolitics, geography, energy autonomy, climate change, and a desire to preserve the environment (BMWK, 2021, 2022a, and 2023a; Bundesregierung, 2023a).

This analysis will examine Germany's energy security strategy and the goal of "Energiewende," or energy transition. It will explore the challenges and threats motivating German energy policy and those that might impede its implementation. Additionally, the analysis will review the expectations and objectives of German energy security goals and examine the governmental, political, and commercial structures and entities involved in the development and execution of German energy security policy. This report will also address the limitations of German energy security.


National Security

A stable energy supply is critical to any nation's security (Dannreuther, 2017; NATO, 2022). Germany faces several strategic vulnerabilities, particularly in the energy sector. If it fails to address these vulnerabilities effectively, it will find it increasingly difficult to realize any of its long-term energy goals (Botsford, 2022; Delcker, 2022; Stelzenmüller, 2022).

Power plants, pipelines, industry, and electrical grids are particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks. Cyberattacks can cause substantial economic damage, supply disruption, and, in general, electricity outages (Delcker, 2022; Joshi, 2022; US Department of Energy, 2021). Germany has identified cybersecurity as a national security priority (Rinaldi, 2022; Tumkevič, 2018). As cyber threats increase, the German Government is reinforcing the agencies tasked with cybersecurity and the defense of critical infrastructure in hopes that German energy systems and infrastructure are adequately safeguarded. The Federal Office for Information Security's (BSI) responsibilities include protecting networks and critical infrastructure against cyberattacks (BSI, 2023; Delcker, 2021, 2022; Goud, 2017). The German Government has also recognized the need to enhance intragovernmental cooperation on cybersecurity by establishing the Bundeswehr's Cyber Innovation Hub (CIHBw) to facilitate collaboration among its military, the private sector, government, and researchers on cybersecurity policy and tools (CIHBw, 2023). Together, these measures and entries contribute to strengthening the reliability of Germany's energy supply (CIHBw, 2023; Delcker, 2022; NATO, 2022).

Germany's reliance on imported energy resources, especially natural gas, is a strategic vulnerability, mainly when the supplying partner is adversarial, unstable, or unreliable (Stelzenmüller, 2022). Germany has made diversifying energy sources a top national security priority (BMWK, 2021 and 2022a).

Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine created a significant geopolitical upheaval, Germany imported natural gas from Russia. Russian natural gas accounted for 55% of Germany's gas imports in 2021; however, this relationship is now fading (Franke, 2022; Kyllmann, 2023a). Berlin thought strong economic relations with Moscow would ensure Germany had a reliable energy supply. However, with geopolitical tension from the war in Ukraine, that calculus appears to have been a misjudgment (Trenin, 2018; Stelzenmüller, 2022).

As Russo-German energy trade relations diminish, Norway has become Germany's primary source of natural gas (Kędzierski, 2022). Germany seeks alternative partners to secure its energy supply while advancing its renewable energy goals (BMWK, 2022a; Reuters and WEF, 2022). Germany also seeks partnerships in non-European regions, including Africa, North America, and the Middle East (Dick, 2023; Dieterich, 2022; Thurau, 2022).


Environmental 

Germany's energy security strategy focuses on realizing its greenhouse gas reduction targets, environmental protection goals, and renewable energy ambitions (BMWK, 2022a). The current leadership in Berlin has an overwhelming political will to meet its goals (Geres et al., 2022; IRENA, 2015; Lepesant, 2023). Germany has reduced its emissions by nearly 36% from its 1990 starting point, but more must still be done if Germany is to achieve its targeted 65% reduction by 2030. Germany has also aimed to reach net-zero emissions by 2045 (Appunn et al., 2023; BMUV, 2021; Bundesregierung, 2023a; OECD, 2023). To meet these goals, Germany has a robust policy agenda that encompasses environmental security, renewable energy projects and technologies, grid improvements, and energy storage systems (BMWK, 2021, 2022a; GTAI, 2019; Umbach, 2023).

Germany faces hotter summers and increased winter precipitation (IEA, 2021; The Climate Reality Project, 2018). The heat leads to additional stresses on the energy grid due to increased consumption and drought, rendering hydropower and power plant temperature management less effective (Halter, 2022; The Climate Reality Project, 2018). Climate change has led to catastrophic floods in Germany (Dewan, 2021). In 2021, Europe was ravaged by floods that killed over 200 people, 184 in Germany alone. The event caused billions in damage to German infrastructure (The Guardian, 2022).

Germany invests in developing and deploying sustainable energy projects that diversify its energy sources, create new economic opportunities, and contribute to regional and international efforts to combat climate change. Germany's renewable energy infrastructure projects and investments in green technologies, such as wind, hydrogen, and solar, can significantly reduce the country's reliance on foreign energy suppliers and fossil fuels (BMUV, 2021a; BMWK, 2020, 2022a).

Germany's North and Baltic Sea regions offer substantial opportunities for green energy through photovoltaic, wave, sea current, and wind generation technologies (Olsen, 2022; Onea & Rusu, 2019). SINN Power, an emerging German renewable technology enterprise, has been experimenting with a system that combines photovoltaic, wind, and wave power generation technologies (Lombardo, 2020).

Germany is promoting the use of photovoltaic systems in residential and commercial buildings, and investing in new energy storage systems to stabilize its grid (BMWK, 2022a; Bundesregierung, 2023a; GTAI, 2019, 2023b; IRENA, 2015). In 2022, Germany announced plans to construct a 220 MW energy storage facility in Western Germany, among other projects, and is investing in energy storage research networks, such as the Fraunhofer Battery Alliance (Diermann, 2022; Ellis, 2022; GTAI, 2019; Nienaber, 2019).

Germany has set ambitious targets for renewable energy. By 2030, the German government aims for renewable energy to account for 80% of its electricity needs (Appunn & Wettengel, 2022; Euronews Green & Reuters, 2023). However, renewable energy generation is subject to intermittence, which stresses the energy supply systems. Germany is investing in technologies such as energy storage systems to address power intermittency issues. Resolving intermittence and ensuring a stable energy supply over the electrical grid will be critical for Germany if its renewable energy objectives are to be feasible (Diermann, 2022; Ellis, 2022; GTAI, 2019; Nienaber, 2019; Smith et al., 2022).

Germany recognizes the potential of hydrogen energy and has dedicated a significant portion of its energy security strategy to developing such technologies (Appunn & Wettengel, 2022; Bundesregierung, 2022, 2023a; Huber, 2021). In 2020, the Federal Government put its National Hydrogen Strategy into motion. The policy package encourages the development of and innovations in blue and green hydrogen technologies by providing €9 billion toward green hydrogen projects (BMWK, 2020; Huber, 2021).

Germany also targets transportation-related emissions by investing in hydrogen power, biofuels, and electric vehicles. Hydrogen power technologies for transportation are a critical environmental goal for Germany (BMWK, 2020, 2022a; Bundesregierung, 2023a; GTAI, 2019). Germany's automotive manufacturing sector has invested in electric-powered vehicles and sold them in global markets (GTAI, 2023c). Overall, this is beneficial for the environment; however, EV technology relies on mineral resources such as lithium and cobalt, which can be extracted in environmentally damaging ways (Luca et al., 2018; Plummer & Tabuchi, 2021).

Germany recently shut down its final three nuclear power plants and has increased its use of coal-fired power plants (The Associated Press, 2022). Germany is extracting more brown coal or lignite, Germany's only domestically sourced energy resource other than renewables (Appunn, 2023a; Stelzenmüller, 2022). The burning of coal generates just over 35% of Germany's electricity; however, Germany has set a target to phase out the use of coal by 2038 (Appunn, 2023a).

Coal use has interfered with Germany's environmental goals (Nicholson, 2018; Panza, 2023). Lignite is mined in extensive, environmentally destructive opencast mines, and burning it is a significant source of carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas (Appunn, 2023a; Nicholson, 2018). Some in the European Parliament have questioned Germany's actions, condemning its increased use of coal to generate energy and framing it as a failure of climate policy and a counter to the goals set by Germany and the European Union more broadly (Panza, 2023).

Economics

German policymakers hope for substantial job growth opportunities in their green energy revolution. Renewable energy goals are driving the growth of an entirely new energy industry. Green energy companies, focusing on power generation and transmission, technology development, and environmental conservation, are on the rise in Germany, and with their growth comes new employment opportunities. In 2019, it was reported that over one million Germans were employed in renewable energy and other sustainability-related industries (BMWK, 2022a, 2023a; Hockenos, 2015).

Nevertheless, Germany's 'Energiewende' involves trade-offs. As renewable power generation increases, the fossil fuel industry will likely become weaker. Layoffs are expected to occur as the fossil fuel industry loses revenue and contracts in scale (AFP, 2019; Shellenberger, 2019; Tsafos, 2020). Germany must invest in workforce retraining programs to help transition workers to the green energy industry or other non-energy-related industries; otherwise, it faces negative economic impacts (BMWK, 2022a; Hoch et al., 2021; Hockenos, 2018). Still, German policymakers maintain that a future where Renewable energy sources meet all of Germany's energy needs will be positive for the Federal Republic's economic growth (Agora Energiewende, 2022; BMWK, 2022a and 2023a). The Federal Republic will need an economically healthy industrial sector, as technology, manufacturing, start-ups, and energy companies will be critical in fueling the technological advancements needed to achieve Germany's long-term renewable energy goals and eliminate strategic vulnerabilities (BMWK, 2021, 2022a, and 2023a; Egenter & Wettengel, 2017).

Furthermore, Germany continues to invest in natural gas and oil projects, as well as import them, as part of its overall energy security strategy. Natural gas pipeline infrastructure has proven to be a poor investment for the Federal Republic (Stelzenmüller, 2022; Wettengel, 2023a and 2023c). Germany invested considerable capital, with its portion of the project funding totaling billions of euros, in the Nord Stream II pipeline project, only to see that capital wasted as geopolitical tensions with Russia increased and Germany suspended its cooperation on the pipeline. Germany was also a significant investor in the Nord Stream I pipeline, the primary route for Russian natural gas imported by Germany; this pipeline has been destroyed (Stelzenmüller, 2022; Wettengel, 2023c).

The Germans and Norwegians have agreed to construct a new pipeline between the two nations to transmit blue hydrogen energy (Cooban, 2023). However, can the security of this new major pipeline be guaranteed?

Alarming maritime activity, including warships and intelligence vessels, has been observed near the United Kingdom and Norway. These ships belong to the Russian Federation and are believed to be monitoring and charting coastal and offshore energy infrastructure, including oil and gas platforms, wind and solar farms, and refining and power generation facilities. The suspicious activity could be intelligence gathering and planning in preparation for an escalation related to heightened geopolitical tensions over the war in Ukraine. Norwegian officials and researchers report that a recently damaged undersea communications line. They have implicated a Russian Navy ship in the incident (BBC News, 2023b; NBC News, 2023). A reasonable question is whether or not new transnational pipeline infrastructure can be safeguarded and is worth the considerable capital investment (BBC News, 2023b; Cooban, 2023; NBC News, 2023).

German policymakers assert that the Federal Republic's commitment to sustainable energy will increase the economic attractiveness for foreign companies and, in general, foreign direct investment. Additionally, Germany is a global leader in renewable energy innovations and hopes investing in these technologies will make German companies internationally competitive as renewable energy demand increases (BMWK, 2022a and 2023a; Caon, 2023; Euronews Green & Reuters, 2023; GTAI, 2023b; Reuters, 2022a).

Germany's energy security strategy faces several limitations to its implementation that will need to be addressed if the German Government is to reach its long-term energy goals. Germany's continued dependence on fossil fuels, along with concerns about the availability and cost of technology, infrastructure investments, and resource access and logistics, pose significant challenges (Aspinall, 2021; Appunn, 2023a; IMF, 2022; Nicholson, 2018; Schauenberg, 2021; Stelzenmüller, 2022; Umbach, 2023; Wettengel, 2023a).

Geopolitical pressures and circumstances related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine have compelled Germany to sever its ties with Russian energy supplies (Stelzenmüller, 2022). The sudden shift in geopolitics left German policymakers scrambling to adapt their energy security strategy to the rapidly deteriorating norms and assumptions of the European security and economic landscapes (Pickrell, 2022; Stelzenmüller, 2022). Germany's energy security strategy had assumed that Germany would have the ability to significantly reduce its dependency on imported fossil fuels with the relatively stable arrangement of Russian energy (Pickrell, 2022; Stelzenmüller, 2022; Trenin, 2018). Germany is now scrambling to find new oil and gas markets to import from and has focused on the rapid construction of new LNG terminals along its coast (BBC News, 2023a; Pickrell, 2022; Stelzenmüller, 2022; Reuters, 2022b; Wettengel, 2022).

The cost of Germany's "Energiewende" is another significant constraint. Germans are concerned about consumer energy costs and regulatory financial burdens; some are also concerned about the cost of the projects required for the transition (Amelang, 2018a; Becker, 2017; Bialek et al., 2023; Reuters, 2022a; Tsafos, 2020; Umbach, 2023). Some argue that the cost of Germany's energy agenda can also manifest as an economic hindrance and that transitioning too rapidly to renewables may impact the overall competitiveness of the German industry (Shellenberger, 2019). Others worry about the impacts on the competitiveness of German companies. Furthermore, the financial burdens placed on consumers and industry by precipitously compounding energy regulations could prove too painful for businesses to weather, significantly smaller-scale enterprises (Amelang, 2018b; Göbel, 2023; Hockenos, 2015). However, the German Government offers financial support to relieve some of that pressure (BMWK, 2022a; Schauenberg, 2021). The Federal Government can continue to mitigate cost burdens and financial damages within its private sector and among ordinary German consumers by ensuring that clear policies and implementation processes are accompanied by support and guidance (BMWK, 2022a; Schauenberg, 2021).

Germany will need to invest substantial capital in financing, developing, and modernizing its energy infrastructure as it transitions away from fossil fuel power generation toward renewable energy sources (BMWK, 2022a, 2023a; Bundesregierung, 2023a; Reuters, 2022a). According to a study by the German Institute for Economic Research, the total investment required to achieve Germany's climate neutrality target by 2045 is estimated to be more than two trillion euros. This cost includes regulating and subsidizing energy-efficient building programs, sustainable construction, and manufacturing processes (Schauenberg, 2021). 

Geopolitical Context - European Union

As the largest economy in Europe, Germany wields significant influence within the European Union (IMF, 2021; Manevich et al., 2017). Germany's energy leadership has a significant impact on the policies emerging from Brussels (Cunningham, 2017; Kurmayer et al., 2023; Manevich et al., 2017). While Germany held the European Council Presidency, it prioritized climate change policy for the EU (BMUV, 2021b; Bundesregierung, 2023a).

 The European continent has the most extensive synchronous electrical grid in the world. Europe's Continental Europe Synchronous Area (CESA) delivers power to millions of Europeans (ENTSO-E, 2022). Within CESA, 39 Transmission System Operators (TSO) manage the grid in 35 nations (ENTSO-E, 2023). These TSOs operate within the multinational association known as the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). They are partnered with European Union member states to ensure a stable energy supply across the CESA region and work to address the environmental impacts of energy generation and transmission (ENTSO-E, 2022). Germany is a member of the ENTSO-E with four TSO member companies, the most from any country (ENTSO-E, 2023).

Germany makes a significant contribution to the European electricity supply network (Umbach, 2023). If Germany's energy security strategy is successful, the country can help reduce the European Union's dependency on fossil fuels by increasing renewable energy production and developing energy storage technologies. As an EU member state, Germany can promote technology sharing and contribute renewable energy-generated electricity to the shared European grid (BMUV, 2021b; BMWK, 2022a; Cunningham, 2017; European Union, 2023; GTAI, 2019; Umbach, 2023).

Geopolitical Context - North and South America

The Germans want to strengthen transatlantic technology sharing and deepen cooperation on climate action (BMWK, 2022a; Göbel, 2023; Meza, 2021; The White House, 2021). With geopolitical tensions eroding Russo-German economic relations, Germany has increased its LNG imports from North America (Dick, 2023; Stelzenmüller, 2022; Shiryaevskaya, 2023; Wettengel, 2022). Additionally, Germany is a leading source of foreign direct investment in the United States for sustainable energy technologies (Caon, 2023; US Department of Commerce, 2021).

The United States, Germany, and Canada are all members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), focusing on mutual defense and security. An element of their commitments is ensuring that each member is stable and reducing strategic vulnerabilities; energy security is a part of their mission (NATO, 2019, 2022, and 2023).

In South America, Germany promotes renewable energy projects and multilateral efforts to mitigate climate change (BMWK, 2022a, 2022b; Peduzzi, 2023; Röhrkasten, 2018). Germany is also interested in South America as a source of natural resources needed to power its energy transition, like lithium for batteries (Berti, 2023; MacDonald, 2023).

Geopolitical Context - China

Chinese investments in renewable technologies have become a source of competition for German companies, especially those developing photovoltaic technologies. China has dramatically expanded its manufacturing of solar panels, and instead of relying on domestic production, Germany has become dependent on imported Chinese solar panels. More than 90% of solar panels used in Germany are imported from China (Ivanova, 2023; Wehrmann, 2022b).

The global push for sustainability and green energy is driving up the demand for rare earth resources (Baskaran, 2022). While Germany has minor domestic cobalt sources, which are vital in EV battery manufacturing, it relies on imports of raw materials, including rare earth elements (Horn et al., 2021; Umbach, 2021; Wrede, 2022).

Germany relies on China for rare earth resources (Umbach, 2021; Watzel, 2023; Xinhua, 2023). Even as it breaks its dependency on imported fossil fuels, the Federal Republic depends on natural resource imports for its green revolution; this reality exposes Germany to additional strategic vulnerabilities and potentially constrains its renewable energy efforts (BMWK, 2022a; Baskaran, 2022; Kullik, 2019; Umbach, 2021; Wrede, 2022; Xinhua, 2023).

Geopolitical Context - Africa and the Middle East

African nations offer opportunities for Germany's energy diversification efforts. The German Government is focused on renewable energy and sustainability, but still, in the short term, needs alternative sources of minerals and fossil fuels to meet its energy demands. Germany is looking to African countries as alternative suppliers of natural resources (BMWK, 2022a; Dieterich, 2022; Kyllmann, 2022; Mugabi, 2022; Müller, 2023). Nigeria and Algeria are LNG exporting nations and potential partners for Germany (NTU, 2022; Ojewale, 2022; Weiß, 2022).

Africa has abundant natural resources to fuel Germany's renewable energy transition (Kyllmann, 2022). Countries like South Africa have significant rare earth mineral deposits that could help Germany reduce its dependency on Chinese-sourced rare earths (Baskaran, 2022; Watzel, 2023; Wrede, 2022; Xinhua, 2023).

Additionally, Germany has the opportunity to lead in renewable energy development and climate change mitigation efforts (BMWK, 2022a; Dieterich, 2022; Müller, 2023). Utilizing economic and energy-focused soft power by guiding the development of sustainable technologies and renewable energy projects will help strengthen Germany's geopolitical relations in Africa (BMWK, 2022a; Kyllmann, 2022, 2023b).

The Middle East is a significant energy producer and, as such, a target of German efforts to diversify energy sources (Di Paola et al., 2022; GlobalData Energy, 2022). Germany imports petroleum oils and gases from Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and considers Iraq a possible gas supplier (OEC, 2021a, 2021b; Reuters, 2022d; Stickings, 2023). Germany is also collaborating with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to develop hydrogen energy (BMWK, 2020, 2022c; GlobalData Energy, 2022).


Domestic Policies and Politics

The German Government is currently led by a coalition of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Green Party, and the Free Democratic Party (FDP), headed by Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz, a member of the SPD. Under current leadership, Germany is focused on creating and implementing policy measures to support the growth of renewable energy adoption, tax incentives, and subsidies for renewable energy infrastructure and technology development (BMWK, 2022a; Bundesregierung, 2023a; Egenter & Wettengel, 2017; Reuters, 2023). The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is Germany's most prominent political party. The CDU has had a profound influence on German policy, shaping energy security policy for nearly two decades under former Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel, including the policy to phase out the use of nuclear power (Chase & Goldenberg, 2021; Egenter & Wettengel, 2017; Rinke, 2021; Schwägerl, 2011).

Most members of Parliament, regardless of their political party affiliation, agree on the necessity of climate action, but debate how best to balance economic, environmental goals, and energy security (Egenter & Wettengel, 2017; Thurau, 2021). However, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), the Federal Republic's premier far-right political party, argues that human-driven climate change is a hoax and is resolutely opposed to climate action policies; it holds a weak position in the German Parliament (Thurau, 2021).

Germany's "Energiewende" places a significant regulatory and financial burden on consumers and industry. Government subsidies ease the burden of regulations, such as more environmentally friendly and energy-efficient building codes, sustainable construction processes, and consumer appliance efficiency standards (Amelang, 2018a, 2018b; BMWK, 2022a; Bundesregierung, 2023a). Some policies, such as feed-in tariffs, have been considered a burden, and after two decades, Germany is moving on from the mechanism (Sutton, 2021). However, some German companies hope the green energy transition will yield opportunities to innovate, create new jobs, and gain a competitive edge in regional and international markets (Agora Energiewende, 2022; Amelang, 2018b; Göbel, 2023).

Germany's climate action measures have been established through the implementation of several significant policy packages, including (1) the Renewable Energy Sources Act, which aims to promote the development of renewable energy sources and grant priority grid access to renewable energy generators. (2) The National Energy Efficiency Action Plan package is focused on improving energy efficiency in buildings, transportation, consumer products, and the industrial sector (Appunn & Wettengel, 2022; BMWK, 2022a). (3) The Climate Action Program for 2030 established a sustainability policy framework and regulations to support the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, increase the use of renewable energy sources, enhance energy efficiency, and promote renewable energy projects (BMWK, 2022a; Wehrmann, 2019a). (4) The National Hydrogen Strategy aims to explore, develop, and implement blue and green hydrogen energy generation (BMWK, 2020). (5) The Federal Climate Change Act was enacted to promote climate action and ensure that Germany can achieve its national climate and emission reduction targets, thereby successfully mitigating climate impacts (BMUV, 2021a; BMWK, 2022a). (6) The Buildings Energy Act is a policy package that establishes and enforces standards for energy-efficient structures and sets guidelines for renewable energy-generated heating (Deloitte, 2020).   

Although Germany is moving toward a future powered by renewable energy, it is essential to remember that Germany is not a homogeneous political entity. The German Government continues to debate many elements of its energy security strategy. German policymakers are attempting to balance economic growth priorities, environmental sustainability goals, and geopolitical concerns, and while these issues are essential to everyone in the German Government, how to approach these matters is of political debate (Amelang, 2018a; Amelang et al., 2019; Appunn & Wettengel, 2022; Aspinall, 2021; The Associated Press, 2023; Tsafos, 2020).

Some German policymakers worry that the country's energy goals are overly ambitious. They argue that the rapid expansion of renewable energy and the near-future emission reduction targets create significant cost burdens for companies and consumers, and that the Federal Republic's overall economic health could be harmed by transitioning away from fossil fuel energy generation too rapidly (Amelang, 2018a, 2018b; Shellenberger, 2019).

However, the German Green Party has argued that Germany has lost focus on sustainability and that there is a lot more Germany should be doing if it is going to remain a leader in renewable energy and sustainability policy (Aspinall, 2021; Rinaldi et al., 2023; Thurau, 2021). However, they have mostly fallen in line, including on the use of coal, and have alienated portions of their base. (Thompson, 2021 and 2023). Furthermore, some political commentators have argued that the cost of Germany's environmental and renewable energy policies has been politically damaging for the German Green Party (Rinaldi et al., 2023).

However, opinion research shows that the German public supports the Government's climate action and renewable energy agenda. A 2020 survey conducted by the European Commission found that 87% of Germans believe the European Union should increase its use of renewable energy, while 76% believe reducing greenhouse gas emissions should be a top priority for the European Union (Wettengel, 2023b).

Additionally, Germany recently fulfilled a long-time promise to shut down its final nuclear power plants (The Associated Press, 2023). The elimination of German nuclear energy was driven by public and political perceptions of the safety and environmental impacts of the energy source (Appunn, 2023b; Becker, 2017; The Associated Press, 2023). However, concerns have been raised that Germany's decision to eliminate nuclear power was premature in the current European energy crisis (The Associated Press and Reuters, 2023; Shellenberger, 2018). The German Government temporarily delayed the decommissioning of its final three power plants but has now completed that goal (BBC News, 2022; The Associated Press, 2023).

Final Thoughts

The German energy security strategy is centered on the goal of creating a more self-reliant, secure, sustainable, and environmentally friendly Germany (BMWK, 2021, 2022a; Westphal, 2021). Germany emphasizes reaching its sustainability and emission reduction targets through its ongoing investments in renewable energy (BMWK, 2022a; Bundesregierung, 2022; and 2023a). German policymakers believe that this focus will allow Germany to reduce its dependence on imported and domestic fossil fuels (BMWK, 2022a). The German Government also asserts that its renewable and sustainable energy investments will enhance the country's overall energy security and economic health by mitigating its exposure to energy market volatility, supply disruptions, and geopolitical risks (BMWK, 2021, 2022a, and 2023a; Westphal, 2021). Still, the Germans must overcome several challenges to their energy security policy agenda. These challenges include domestic political opposition, high costs, availability of natural resources, reliance on carbon-intensive energy sources, cybersecurity threats, and geopolitical uncertainties (Amelang, 2018a; Pickrell, 2022; Rinaldi et al., 2023; Schauenberg, 2021; Thompson, 2023; Umbach, 2021 and 2023; Wettengel, 2023a; Wrede, 2022).

Despite deteriorating Russo-German relations and Germany's high demand for fossil fuels, the energy crisis intensified Germany's desire for renewable energy sources. Germans aim to accelerate their efforts toward achieving so-called energy sovereignty (Reuters, 2022c; Westphal, 2021).

However, even if the Germans succeed in all aspects of their energy security strategy and reach their goal of energy demand being met by 100% renewable energy, the raw materials it needs to maintain these technologies will need to be imported as Germany has few to no domestic sources of critical metals or rare earths, and this forms additional dimensions of vulnerability (Umbach, 2021; Watzel, 2023; Wrede, 2022; Xinhua, 2023).

The continued reliance on carbon-intensive energy sources poses a threat to the environment and is counterproductive to Germany's sustainability goals; however, it promises to end this dependence and strengthen climate action efforts (BMWK, 2021, 2022a; Pickrell, 2022; Stelzenmüller, 2022; Wettengel, 2023a). Germany must continue to diversify its energy suppliers as its dependency on a limited number of supplying partners encourages vulnerabilities (BMWK, 2021 and 2022a). Still, Germany is a global leader in renewable energy and sustainability initiatives. Germany will need to continue investing in renewable energy infrastructure and technologies to meet its climate goals. These technologies can be expensive to develop, but they offer potential economic and security benefits (BMWK, 2021, 2022a, 2023a; IRENA, 2015; Reuters, 2022a). If Germany can successfully overcome the limitations of geography, import dependency, and the high costs associated with policy implementation and energy transition, it can build a more secure, sustainable, and robust energy system (BMWK, 2021, 2022a, and 2023a; Bundesregierung, 2022 and 2023a; Aspinall, 2021; Watzel, 2023). 

Additional Reading - Key Stakeholders and Influencers

Domestic Governmental Entities

Various governmental entities create, implement, and regulate Germany's energy security strategy. Germany's Federal Ministries and their agencies are overseen by the Bundestag and Bundesrat (Federal Parliament) and the Chancellor's Office. These entities collaborate to meet Germany's energy security objectives while balancing economic, environmental, and political considerations (Bundesregierung, 2023b; Bundestag, 2023; Egenter and Wettengel, 2017). The major domestic governmental entities involved in the creation, adoption, implementation, and defense of Germany's energy priorities include:

The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK) is responsible for developing and implementing Germany's energy policies, regulating energy and transportation networks, and supporting industries. Within the BMWK, several agencies work to implement, manage, and enforce German energy security strategies and policies (BMWK, 2023b). (1) The Bundesnetzagentur, or the Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railway (BNetzA), regulates and manages German transportation networks and ensures the German energy supply is stable and secure. Additionally, BNetzA regulates and supports Germany's energy companies and markets (BNetzA, 2023). (2) The Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) is responsible for promoting the use of renewable energy and providing guidance on best practices for energy efficiency. Additionally, BAFA works closely with the coal and oil industry to implement federal policies (BAFA, 2023). (3) The Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) provides technical and geosciences-related advice to the Federal Government. Additionally, BGR analyzes the exploration, extraction, and stockpiling of energy resources, including petroleum oils and gases, coal, and uranium. BGR also studies and advises on domestic and foreign sources of rare earths and other resources vital in producing renewables and low-to-non-carbon-intensive technologies (BGR, 2023).   

The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMUV) is responsible for developing climate action and environmental security policies, as well as ensuring that natural resources are managed appropriately. Moreover, the BMUV oversees the decommissioning of nuclear power facilities and the management of nuclear waste through the Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (BASE) and with the support of the Nuclear Waste Management Commission (ESK) (BASE, 2022; BMUV, 2021c; ESK, 2023).


Companies, Unions, Issue Groups, and NGOs

Germany depends on its major energy companies to manage its energy supply and realize its "Energiewende" (Egenter & Wettengel, 2017). These companies include:

Uniper is Germany's largest power generation company, operating in four dozen nations. The company's primary focus is natural gas and energy storage (Clean Energy Wire, 2017; Egenter & Wettengel, 2017). Uniper has recently been nationalized due to the geopolitical and economic fallout resulting from the war in Ukraine (Reuters, 2022e).

Two of Germany's most vital utility companies are RWE AG and E.ON. RWE AG is involved with coal power generation and coal mines but also has a substantial role in renewables, especially wind generation (Clean Energy Wire, 2014; Egenter & Wettengel, 2017). E.ON is involved in nearly every aspect of the energy industry, focusing on high-tech energy grids, energy transition, hydrogen energy generation and storage projects, and sustainable technologies (E.ON, 2023; Egenter & Wettengel, 2017).

Wintershall is Germany's largest oil and gas producer; the company is involved with oil and gas discovery, extraction, and transportation operations (Wintershall, 2023a). Wintershall is a subsidiary of BASF, the world's largest chemical enterprise (Wintershall, 2023a, 2023b).

The German Energy Agency (dena) is accountable for providing a framework for energy efficiency regulations, helping implement building efficiency standards, and expanding renewable energy (Clean Energy Wire, 2023; dena, 2023). The German Federal Government partially owns the German Energy Agency, but it operates as a private firm (IEA, 2017).

Germany has several technology companies, such as Siemens, that have critical roles in Germany's energy security interests (Egenter & Wettengel, 2017; Siemens, 2023). Additionally, labor unions such as IG Metall, a union representing the Federal Republic's manufacturing sector and potions of the energy sector, and IG BCE, a union involved with German mining, chemical, and energy industries, play a significant role in domestic politics and Germany's workforce (Egenter & Wettengel, 2017; IG BCE, 2023; IG Metall, 2023). Furthermore, domestic and international issue groups and NGOs such as Friends of the Earth Germany and the Climate Alliance Germany influence the Federal Republic's energy and climate action policies. Together, these entities significantly impact the entire German energy sector through politics, lobbying, public pressure, and other means by exercising political power at all levels of government and private enterprises (BUND, 2023; Climate Alliance Germany, 2023; Egenter & Wettengel, 2017).


Banks, Insurers, and Investors

Net Zero Banking Alliance Germany (NZBAG) is part of an international banking alliance formed to promote, finance, and develop environmental and green energy projects. NZBAG has eight prominent banking and financial institutions, including Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank, Germany's most significant financial companies (Marsh, 2023; NZBAG, 2023; Wehrmann, 2019b). Germany's GLS Bank recently ended its relationship with the Net Zero Banking Alliance, becoming disillusioned with the organization. GLS Bank frames itself as a "sustainable" and "ethical" bank, and it could no longer be a member of an organization that was supposed to be focused on sustainable projects but, in reality, has some of its most notable members still financing and supporting new and existing fossil fuel infrastructure and operations around the globe. GLS Bank continues to support renewable energy projects (GLS Bank, 2023; Marsh, 2023; Wehrmann, 2019b).

Deutsche Bank is the leading private banking and financial institution in the Federal Republic. It invests in the energy industry and has pledged to reduce its investments in carbon-intensive projects (Deutsche Bank, 2023; Wehrmann, 2019b).

Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) is one of the most important of Germany’s banking institutions. KfW is a state-owned public development bank. Germany uses this bank to invest in nearly all aspects of its renewable energy and climate action initiatives, from energy efficiency to renewables (KfW, 2023; Wehrmann, 2019b). Additionally, the German Bundesbank, the central bank of the Federal Republic, is heavily involved in the country's renewable energy projects and sustainability regulations, as well as across the European Union. The Bundesbank is integrated with the European banking systems (Bundesbank, 2023; Wehrmann, 2019b).

Allianz is a major global insurance company investing in climate action programs and the energy industry in Germany and worldwide. Allianz aims to end investments in carbon-intensive energy projects and resource extraction by 2050 (Allianz, 2023; Wehrmann, 2019b).

International Bodies

Germany is committed to climate change mitigation and promoting renewable energy globally (BMWK, 2022a, 2022b, and 2022c, Bundesregierung, 2023a; Geres et al., 2022). Germany utilizes its membership in multilateral international bodies like the European Union, G7, G20, and the United Nations to advocate for renewable energy initiatives, international cooperation, and dialogue on climate security (Auswaertiges Amt, 2023; BMWK, 2022a; BMUV, 2921b; Nugent, 2021; Wettengel, 2018).

 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has significantly influenced the direction of German energy security policy. It was responsible for creating and adopting the Paris Climate Agreement, of which Germany is a signatory (Appunn, 2015; DW News, 2016). Germany has attempted to construct its energy security strategy around the principles of the Paris Climate Agreement (BMWK, 2022a).

While Germany is not a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), OPEC has considerable influence over the global oil market, which impacts German calculus as it works to strengthen its energy security (BMWK, 2023c).

Deutsche Bank is the leading private banking and financial institution in the Federal Republic. It invests in the energy industry and has pledged to reduce its investments in carbon-intensive projects (Deutsche Bank, 2023; Wehrmann, 2019b).

Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) is one of the most important of Germany’s banking institutions. KfW is a state-owned public development bank. Germany uses this bank to invest in nearly all aspects of its renewable energy and climate action initiatives, from energy efficiency to renewables (KfW, 2023; Wehrmann, 2019b). Additionally, the German Bundesbank, the central bank of the Federal Republic, is heavily involved in the country's renewable energy projects and sustainability regulations, as well as across the European Union. The Bundesbank is integrated with the European banking systems (Bundesbank, 2023; Wehrmann, 2019b).

Allianz is a major global insurance company investing in climate action programs and the energy industry in Germany and worldwide. Allianz aims to end investments in carbon-intensive energy projects and resource extraction by 2050 (Allianz, 2023; Wehrmann, 2019b).

Großkrotzenburg Power Station.
A coal-fired thermal station on the Main River near Frankfurt in Großkrotzenburg, Germany.


Photo by Chad Lawhorn, 2015.

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