Chad Lawhorn | September 08, 2023

Nuclear Non-Proliferation - Russian Federation and the United States

Introduction

It is now more important than ever to revisit and revitalize non-proliferation discussions between the United States and the Russian Federation. Given the rising tensions and technological advancements in weaponry, renewed dialogue between the United States and the Russian Federation is essential to prevent an uncontrolled arms race. An uncontrolled arms race would further destabilize the global security landscape. Modern missile technologies, such as hypersonic missiles, present new challenges for arms control. Addressing these challenges in updated agreements is crucial to ensure strategic stability. As major nuclear powers, the United States and the Russian Federation are responsible for leading global non-proliferation efforts. Their cooperation can set the stage for broader international arms control initiatives and collaboration (ACA, 2023; CRS, 2022; Kaur, 2023

Ensuring unbiased discussions and facilitating trust-building, engaging a neutral third-party mediator, such as the United Nations or another international body, is crucial. More stringent verification mechanisms should be implemented than those of the original INF Treaty, including regular inspections, data exchanges, and joint oversight committees. While the main dialogue should occur between the United States and the Russian Federation, it is essential to incorporate the concerns and inputs of NATO members and other allies to ensure that any new treaty is widely accepted and effective. Confidence-building measures between the primary parties must focus on compliance transparency, with a component of trust and respect to ensure the success of these efforts. A robust arms control framework must consider national security interests (Arbatov, 2020; Kaur, 2023).

Challenges in Strategic Arms Control

Strategic arms control efforts are facing a challenging environment. With Russia upgrading its nuclear arsenal, adopting a more aggressive strategic stance, and pulling out of treaties, there are growing concerns about the stability and viability of arms control agreements (Arbatov, 2020; Courtney & Klotz, 2023; Kaur, 2023; Kazi & Singh, 2023; U.S. GAO, 2023; Wachs, 2022). In the Putin era, several critical arms control efforts have expired or otherwise eroded (Colby, 2016; CRS, 2022; Kaur, 2023). Disagreements have arisen regarding missile defense systems, novel nuclear delivery systems like hypersonic missiles, and tactical nuclear weapons (CRS, 2022; Pifer, 2021; Rumer, 2023). Russia has invested heavily in advanced technologies, including hypersonic missiles, nuclear-powered cruise missiles such as the Burevestnik, and new heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) like the RS-28, which complicates arms control negotiations (Colby, 2016; CRS, 2022; Balatsky & Wolkov, 2012; Kaur, 2023). 

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has complicated arms control efforts. Russia's assertive military posture and nuclear signaling, combined with the failure of its conventional forces, have led it to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons for deterrence and geopolitical leverage(CRS, 2022; Dreuzy & Gilli, 2022; Singh, 2023; Sky News, 2023). There are concerns that Russia's updates to its arsenal and adoption of a confrontational posture could spark a new global arms race, particularly in the wake of the Ukraine crisis (Panda, 2023; Wachs, 2022). A worst-case scenario for Russo-American nuclear arms control in the wake of the Ukraine war involves a continued lack of interest from Russia in substantive arms control dialogue. This stance might be emboldened by their investments in new technologies and the belief that such capabilities offer a strategic edge, undermining the incentives for arms control (Arbatov, 2020; CRS, 2022; Lissner, 2021; Pifer, 2021; U.S. GAO, 2023; Wachs, 2022). The United States and the Russian Federation should prioritize reopening communication channels, focusing solely on arms control. The dialogues should be consistent, structured, and aimed at achieving concrete agreements. Any new treaty or agreement should encompass newer weapon systems and technologies, including addressing concerns related to hypersonic missiles and other advanced delivery systems such as Russia's Burevestnik missile, which is capable of solid-fuel and nuclear-fission powered flight, and the Sarmat super-heavy ICBM or any MIRV capable device (CRS, 2022; Kaur, 2023).

A Path Forward

The withdrawal from the INF Treaty presents a unique opportunity for the United States and the Russian Federation to develop a modern and comprehensive arms control agreement, taking into account current challenges and emerging technologies. Revitalizing efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is critical for maintaining a positive relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation and for promoting global peace and stability. Both nations must recognize the importance of this issue and work together to ensure that the 21st century is not marked by a destabilizing arms race but rather a recommitment to global security (Kaur, 2023).

Although bilateral efforts are essential, the ultimate goal is to develop a more comprehensive international framework encompassing intermediate-range missiles and exotic weapon systems. This will require the involvement of China, India, Pakistan, and other nuclear powers in a genuinely global non-proliferation initiative (Arbatov, 2020; Kaur, 2023). Arms control negotiations have become more complex due to modern technology and Russia's evolving nuclear strategy and geostrategic reality, making arms control agreements increasingly misaligned with Russia's doctrinal scope and deterrence needs (Courtney & Klotz, 2023; CRS, 2022; Nikitin & Oznobishchev, 2008; Rajaraman, 2023). This reality raises the stakes, as failing to adapt to new technologies and geopolitical dynamics could trigger nuclear competition and undermine progress in arms control (Courtney & Klotz, 2023; Gottemoeller, 2022). 

Treaties must be built to address modern weapons systems and the development of new systems. This will require serious compromise, but the fact is that Russia and the United States have a responsibility to work together and lead on nuclear arms control. Treaties should not just focus on strategic weapon systems but also address the proliferation of low-yield tactical devices. Eliminating strategic weapons alone encourages the focus on theater-level nuclear weapon development to compensate for any strategic loss to deterrence capabilities (Arbatov, 2020; U.S. GAO, 2023). 

Successful future arms control efforts will require renewed commitments to bilateral and multilateral agreements. Moreover, engaging a recalcitrant Russia in meaningful dialogue requires continued political will and novel approaches to diplomatic engagement, such as involving developing nuclear powers like India and China in the development of arms control frameworks (Gottemoeller, 2022, 2023; U.S. GAO, 2023). Any direct attempt with Moscow might require a track 1.5 or 2 diplomatic approach, such as quiet back-channel diplomacy, which may be more effective than official channels subject to public scrutiny (Bender, 2022; Gottemoeller, 2023). 

Controlling nuclear armaments is a significant challenge, particularly when geopolitical tensions are escalating and states rationally seek to enhance their strategic deterrent. Restarting non-proliferation talks with Moscow has stalled, as the Kremlin is determined to set conditions for renewed dialogue on Ukraine, including war demands, interests, and outcomes. Meanwhile, the United States and its allies are interested in separating the dialogue regarding nuclear weapons from the Ukraine war. Nevertheless, the United States must be determined and steadfast in its efforts to pursue non-proliferation objectives with the Russian Federation. The discussion should focus solely on nuclear weapons issues to ensure global stability. However, geopolitical realities, such as the Ukraine war and Russia's perceived security concerns, must be considered (Arbatov, 2020; Associated Press, 2022; Gilli & Dreuzy, 2022). However, any compromise must not jeopardize the security of U.S. allies and partners. If the national security of U.S. strategic partners is at greater risk, it would also hinder the acceptance of any renewed dialogue or new treaty (Arbatov, 2020; Becker, 2020; Kaur, 2023).

References

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