Chad Lawhorn | October 30, 2021

Russia, the Arctic, and Climate Change.

Introduction

In this era of climate change, Russia is facing increasing pressure from regional powers with Arctic borders, as well as those without. The Arctic's strategic and economic value is gaining more attention as the climate shifts, creating new opportunities. There is a sense of urgency in Moscow, and they hope to take advantage of climate change, Arctic resources, and their vast Arctic Region (Adomaitis, 2020; Conley, 2021; Gricius, 2020; Lanteigne & Shi, 2021; Lustgarten, 2020; Melino & Conley, 2021; Russian Federation, 2019, 2020a, 2020b; Strong, 2020; Warsaw Institute, 2020).

Russia's economy is heavily dependent on hydrocarbon resources. Moscow sees establishing itself as the dominant power in the Arctic, a region rich in these resources, as crucial for its economic sustainability well into the future (EMISS, 2019; Russian Federation, 2021; Gricius, 2020; Rumer et al., 2021; TASS, 2021; World Bank Group, 2021). The continued march of climate change is viewed more as an opportunity in Moscow, as the Arctic becomes increasingly thawed, opening up trade routes and unlocking long-locked-away natural resources (Conley, 2021; Lustgarten, 2020; Rumer et al., 2021; Russian Federation, 2019, 2020a, 2020b). 

Russia has developed an ambitious plan for its Arctic zone. The Russian Federation's Arctic strategic priorities documents are a structure for ensuring economic growth and national security with an underlying motivation based on a warming climate and understanding that with climate changes come potential economic opportunities that carry the nation into the future as a key global player (Interfax, 2018; Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 2021; Russian Federation, 2019, 2020a, 2020b, 2021; TASS, 2021).

While Moscow's strategic behavior in the Arctic has the end goals of economic stability and national security, the renewed intensity of Russia's Arctic interests is opportunistic, given the changing reality in the Arctic climate. Many of the priorities outlined in Moscow's Arctic strategy documents would only be achievable with a warmer Arctic environment, as known in Moscow. The shifting climate, specifically the warming of the environment, has been the primary catalyst for higher interest levels in the Arctic region and a motivator for the Russian Federation's Arctic strategy. The warming climate in the Arctic has created new opportunities and threats for Russia, and thus, its strategy has taken on a heavy Arctic focus (Bloomberg, 2013; Conley, 2021; Gricius, 2020; Kramer, 2021; Lustgarten, 2020; NASA, 2021; Russia Briefing, 2021; Russian Federation, 2019, 2020a, 2020b; Rumer et al., 2021; Schneider, 2018; Strong, 2020; TASS, 2020, 2021).

Climate Change and the Arctic's Growing Global Importance

As our climate warms and the Arctic ice sheet retreats, the Arctic region is gaining significant attention from the international community. This heightened interest is primarily due to its potential strategic value and, more importantly, its future economic significance. Beneath the Arctic ice lies a wealth of untapped natural resources, particularly hydrocarbons like coal, oil, and gas (Adomaitis & Solsvik, 2020; Gricius, 2020; Khorrami, 2021; Kobzeva, 2019; Lanteigne & Shi, 2021; Macalister, 2011; Nesheiwat, 2021; Rumer et al., 2021; Strong, 2020). According to a 2018 report by the American Geosciences Institute, the Arctic is estimated to hold 16% of the world's undiscovered oil resources, 30% of its undiscovered gas, and 38% of its undiscovered natural gas liquids (Allison & Mandler, 2018). These resources bring substantial economic benefits to companies and countries that can locate and extract them. With the diminishing Arctic ice and the right technology, these resources will become increasingly accessible (Gazprom Neft, 2021a, 2021b; Rumer et al., 2021; Russian Federation, 2019, 2020a, 2020b; Strong, 2020; TASS, 2021). 

The Arctic, with a more miniature ice sheet, brings Russia new natural resource extraction opportunities to boost its economy, which is already based mainly on hydrocarbon resources such as oil and gas, an event likely not possible without a warming Arctic environment (Conley, 2021; EMISS, 2019; Gricius, 2020; Lustgarten, 2020; Macalister, 2011; Nesheiwat, 2021; Rumer et al., 2021; Strong, 2020; TASS, 2021; Warsaw Institute, 2020; World Bank Group, 2021). Drawing on economic data from the World Bank and Russia's Unified Interdepartmental Information and Statistical System (EMISS), a governmental information resource provided by the Federal State Statistics Service and Ministry of Communications and Mass Media, it is evident that the Russian Federation's economy is heavily reliant on hydrocarbons, with these resources (oil, gas, and coal) accounting for around 60% of its GDP in 2019 (EMISS, 2019, World Bank Group, 2021). According to TASS, the Russian News Agency, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak has said, "The potential of the Arctic zone is huge. Speaking about offshore resources only, those are 15 billion metric tons of oil and around 100 trillion cubic meters of gas. That will suffice for decades, hundreds of years if they are required, and it is economically reasonable" (TASS, 2021). The strategic benefits of Arctic resources, situated along busy global trade routes, are highly enticing to world powers seeking to meet their economic needs and energy demands. In the view of Russia and other powers, the shifting climate presents an opportunity in the Arctic (Rumer et al., 2021; Russian Federation, 2019, 2020a, 2020b; Sittlow, 2020; Strong, 2020).

As the climate warms and the ice recedes, new trade routes will open, and existing ones will become more traversable. The Arctic offers shorter trade routes between Asia and Europe compared to other significant routes outside the Arctic (Comiso et al., 2021; Kulinko, 2021; Melino & Conley, 2021; NASA, 2021; Schneider, 2018; Strong, 2020). The Arctic has four main trade routes: the Northwest Passage, the Northeast Passage, the Transpolar Sea Route, and the Northern Sea Route, the latter of which runs through Russian territorial waters (Kulinko, 2021; NASA, 2021; Schneider, 2018; USNIC, 2020). These trade routes have seen relatively little contention in recent decades. However, now, as we have begun to take a turn for the worse in terms of global warming, with Russia's side of the Arctic warming faster than other portions of the region, there are new interests in the area (Gricius, 2020; Kramer, 2021; Macalister, 2011; NASA, 2021; Offshore Technology, 2021; Rumer et al., 2021; Russian Federation, 2019, 2020a, 2020b; Strong, 2020; TASS, 2021).

The Russian territory represents the majority of the Arctic coastline, potentially allowing Russia to dominate the trade flow along the Northeast Passage and Northern Sea Route. This increased trade activity could bring new economic development to the Russian North, giving Russia's Arctic ports new life, a fact not lost on Moscow (Arctic Russia, 2021a; Gricius, 2020; Kulinko, 2021; Rumer et al., 2021; Schneider, 2018; TASS, 2021). The Russian Federation aims to capitalize on the increased trade activity in the thawing Arctic to drive new economic growth in shrinking Arctic coastal towns, cities, and ports. With reduced seasonal ice, Russia has made some progress revitalizing Arctic ports (Bloomberg, 2013; Conley, 2021; Gazprom Neft, 2021a, 2021b; Gricius, 2020; Kramer, 2021; Kulinko, 2021; Lustgarten, 2020; NASA, 2021; Russian Federation, 2019, 2020a, 2020b; Schneider, 2018; Strong, 2020).

Challenges and Solutions

Russia states that it has a deficit in some capabilities and technologies, which hinders its goals. To take full advantage of the changing climate, it needs to modernize existing assets and invest more heavily in researching and developing new capabilities and technologies. A significant portion of Russia's strategic priorities in the Arctic is geared toward mobilizing and modernizing existing resources, strengthening readiness, and investing in sectors that have been historically neglected. In Moscow's view, climate change is a situation that can be harnessed for its benefit, but to prevail, they must be successful at the implementation of their strategic goals that deal with protecting their interests in the region and developing the tools and capabilities they need to take full benefit from new economic opportunities (Conley, 2021; Lustgarten, 2020; Russian Federation, 2019, 2020a, 2020b; TASS, 2021a).

To be better prepared for the new trade and other economic activities that will be possible with a warmer climate, Russia plans to invest heavily in the region over the next 15 years, beginning with several large-scale economic infrastructure projects (Gazprom Neft, 2021a, 2021b; Gricius, 2020; Lustgarten, 2020; Macalister, 2011; Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 2021; Nesheiwat, 2021; Ponomarenko, 2021; Rumer et al., 2021; Russian Federation, 2019, 2020a, 2020b; Strong, 2020; TASS, 2021). Russian documents, officials, and governmental websites have repetitively cited new economic and technological developments and economic activity opportunities in the Arctic region as the climate warms (Arctic Russia, 2021a, 2021b, 2021c, 2021d; Gazprom Neft, 2021a; Ponomarenko, 2021; Russian Federation, 2019, 2020a, 2020b, 2021; TASS, 2021; The Arctic, 2021). According to Russia's TASS, President Putin has stated, "Here is our future, including from the point of view of extracting mineral resources, which our country will need in the long run" (TASS, 2021). Russia has long envisioned a developed Arctic zone. Still, due to the harsh environment, lack of proper technology, technical knowledge, administrative structures, etc., many infrastructure and urban economic projects—cities and ports capable of sustaining economic activities—have not been fully realized (Gricius, 2020; Rumer et al., 2021; Russian Federation, 2019, 2020a, 2020b; TASS, 2021).

However, as the climate warms, Moscow sees a cause for hope and a future of opportunity. That is not to say that Russia does not recognize potential threats that will likely arise due to climate change. Their strategic documents on the Arctic and the Eastern portions of the country are saturated with environmental concerns and environmental protection considerations, but Moscow sees climate change as more of an opportunity than a threat (Arctic Russia, 2021a, 2021b, 2021c, 2021d; IEA, 2021a, 2021b; Lustgarten, 2020; Ponomarenko, 2021; Russian Federation, 2019, 2020a, 2020b, 2021; Strong, 2020; TASS, 2021). Declaring in a government order titled, "National Action Plan: The first stage of adaptation to climate change for the period up to 2022," that "Taking measures to adapt to climate change is necessary to reduce losses and use the benefits associated with future climate change" (Russian Federation, 2019).

The Russian Federation has built a strategic framework within its recent ambitious Arctic policy documents that will define its strategic priorities in the Arctic region for nearly the next two decades with optimism that it can fully benefit from a changing climate (Agosta et al., 2021; Allison & Mandler, 2018; IEA, 2021a, 2021b, 2021c; Lustgarten, 2020; Macalister, 2011; Nesheiwat, 2021; Rumer et al., 2021; Russian Federation, 2019, 2020a, 2020b). The documents frame the renewed push for the Arctic as an attempt to secure Russia's future as the warming climate brings threats and possibilities to the Russian North. Moscow aims to enhance its administrative structures and hold itself accountable for achieving its goals through key performance indicators and benchmarks. In their own words, Russian policymakers and political leaders point to the understanding that a warmer climate can yield benefits to Russia, nowhere more so than in its Arctic zone (Ellyatt, 2019; Lustgarten, 2020; Melino & Conley, 2021; Rumer et al., 2021; Russian Federation, 2019, 2020a, 2020b; TASS, 2021).

Final Thoughts

As the world becomes increasingly aware of the security risks associated with a changing climate, it also becomes aware of the opportunities. Russia is conscious of these potential opportunities and will mobilize on a large scale to ensure its benefits. Moscow's Arctic priorities appear to be encouraged by climate change considerations, not in the traditional understanding of climate change as solely a crisis but as an event that could ultimately bring economic opportunities to Russia (Adomaitis, 2020; Ellehuus & Wall, 2020; Gricius, 2020; Khorrami, 2021; Lanteigne & Shi, 2021; Lustgarten, 2020; Macalister, 2011; Nesheiwat, 2021; Rumer et al., 2021; Russian Federation, 2021; Strong, 2020; TASS, 2021).

Russia has chosen to focus on priorities that will ensure its national security and economic stability as we move forward into an altered climate. For Moscow, a warmer Arctic zone is critical to its strategy. Thus, it will continue to operate to protect its perceived national security and economic growth interests (Conley, 2021; Ellyatt, 2019, 2021; Interfax, 2018; Melino & Conley, 2021; Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 2021; Russian Federation, 2019, 2020a, 2020b; Strong, 2020; Walsh, 2021).

Questions remain on whether the Russian Federation will succeed in its immediate goals and whether those achievements will truly serve Russia and its long-term strategic aims. These questions bring into focus uncertainty about Russia's means and its desired ends. Even if achieved, are those goals compatible with a world characterized by less hydrocarbon demand and smaller fossil fuel markets? Future research should take an evaluative approach to Russia's ability to achieve its goals (Conley, 2021; Ellyatt, 2019; IEA, 2021c; Rumer et al., 2021; Russian Federation, 2019, 2020a, 2020b, 2021; Warsaw Institute, 2020).

The Russian Federation is focused on potentially lucrative economic opportunities associated with trade and unexploited hydrocarbon resources, which are likely to become a reality only with a warmer Arctic and, thus, a less ice-covered region. With these potential benefits firmly in mind, Russian policymakers continue to strengthen their position in the Arctic region through direct and indirect means, utilizing military force, national economic assets, and soft power via entities such as the Arctic Council. These combined efforts, the public commentary, and clear strategic priorities show that Moscow perceives that it can harness the climate crisis to its benefit by dominating the Arctic both economically and militarily, thereby significantly altering the global geopolitical landscape (Arctic Council, 2021; Gross, 2020; Gricius, 2020; Macalister, 2011; Melino & Conley, 2021; Nesheiwat, 2021; Rumer et al., 2021; Russian Federation, 2019, 2020a, 2020b, 2021; Schneider, 2018; Strong, 2020; TASS, 2021; The Arctic, 2021).

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