Chad Lawhorn | November 2025 (Updated December 2025)

Russian Nuclear Energy Diplomacy: Geopolitical Goals, Strengths, And Challenges (2020-2025)

Introduction

Nuclear Energy Diplomacy

Nuclear energy diplomacy can be understood as state-sponsored or state-facilitated cooperation in the civilian nuclear sector that spans reactor design and construction, uranium mining and enrichment, fuel fabrication, training and technical assistance, joint research, and spent fuel management.1 Compared to other forms of energy trade, such cooperation tends to generate distinctive patterns of strategic dependence because reactors operate over several decades, rely on compatible and often supplier-specific fuel, require highly specialized maintenance and technical expertise, and carry nonproliferation and security implications that extend beyond the immediate commercial transaction. Although some reactors do rely on supplier-specific fuel, the global fuel market is gradually diversifying as additional suppliers and fuel assembly capabilities emerge. Still, dependence on incumbent providers remains strong, especially for non-Western designs.2 Rosatom’s foreign engagements reflect this dynamic by extending well beyond reactor construction and typically providing a bundled suite of services that links reactor technology to long-term fuel cycle support, including enriched uranium supply and fuel fabrication, workforce training, operational assistance, and financing that is often underwritten by Russian state-backed loans. These projects can create layers of technological and institutional dependence for recipient states, particularly those with limited domestic nuclear infrastructure, and make shifting to alternative suppliers or building new supply chains both costly and time-consuming. Although such dependencies give Russia potential leverage, available evidence indicates that political use of Rosatom’s supply relationships has so far been limited and not always overt, as Moscow appears to place a premium on preserving Rosatom’s reputation as a reliable exporter and safeguarding the commercial foundations of its global nuclear partnerships even as geopolitical tensions intensify.3

Significance of Russian Nuclear Energy Exports for Geopolitics

Russian nuclear exports are an instrument of Russian statecraft, creating long-term channels of influence over partner states’ energy systems, regulatory frameworks, and broader foreign policy alignment. Rosatom currently dominates the global reactor export market, with estimates indicating that it accounts for roughly 40% to 70% of new reactor contracts and holds the largest share of global enrichment capacity at approximately 38% to 44%. Its foreign orders, valued at around $200 billion, set conditions for long-term dependencies by tying recipient countries to Russian fuel, technology, and related services for the operational lifetime of their nuclear plants, and although some partners have begun exploring diversification options, shifting to alternative suppliers is a complex and time-consuming process for many states.4 Rosatom’s one-stop shop model and its build-own-operate arrangements show how bundled packages that combine construction, financing, training, fuel supply, and spent fuel management embed Russian interests within critical infrastructure and provide Moscow with mechanisms for long-term influence and potential leverage during periods of crisis or high-stakes negotiation. However, the degree of leverage in practice depends on domestic environments, relevant international commitments, and the specific contractual terms governing each project.5 Across the Global South, Rosatom often links its nuclear project packages to financing and high-level summit diplomacy, allowing Russia to present itself as a long-term development partner rather than a purely commercial supplier. This strategy helps differentiate Rosatom’s offer from many Western competitors, which are frequently perceived as slower, more risk-averse, and less flexible in their financing terms. China also provides support and funding for African nuclear and energy projects at varying stages of development and implementation, along with bundled services.6 Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Rosatom has remained mainly outside the scope of heavy sanctions, but it has been subject to targeted export controls and constraints on financing and scientific cooperation. The company has signed more than 70 new agreements since 2022, sustaining and, in some cases, deepening patterns of nuclear interdependence, especially with partners in Africa and Asia and with several post-Soviet states, while many European countries work actively to reduce their reliance on Rosatom in response to security and policy concerns, producing a more uneven and conditional landscape of nuclear interdependence across regions.7

For Russia, nuclear energy diplomacy generates a set of advantages that differ in important ways from those associated with traditional fossil fuel exports.8 (1) Civil nuclear projects lock suppliers and recipients into deep, long-term relationships, since contracts are tied to multi-decade plant lifetimes and often cannot be unwound without very high economic and technical costs. (2) Nuclear cooperation opens diplomatic channels and extends Russian influence in strategically important regions, especially where Western options are limited or where states seek to hedge among major powers. (3) These projects generate significant revenue while simultaneously strengthening Russia’s technological profile and its broader positioning as a significant industrial power within the global energy system.9

The Evolution of Russian Nuclear Energy Statecraft

Russia’s current role as a major exporter of nuclear technology rests heavily on the institutional and industrial legacy of the Soviet nuclear power program, which standardized reactor designs such as the VVER pressurized-water reactor and the RBMK graphite-moderated reactor, and deployed them widely across the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc states. Within this broader pattern, Finland stands out as the only Western European country to host Soviet-built VVER units, making it a rare exception to what was otherwise a primarily regional concentration of Soviet reactor exports in the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union itself.10 Following the Soviet collapse in 1991, Russia inherited this infrastructure but experienced a funding crisis. Only one new station was commissioned between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s; many projects were halted, and the sector survived primarily on minimal domestic investment. By the late 1990s, Moscow had secured reactor export contracts with Iran, China, and India, which helped restart stalled construction lines at home and entrenched nuclear exports as an explicit policy and economic priority for the post-Soviet Russian state.11

In 2007 Russia’s civilian nuclear sector was consolidated under the State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom, which became the successor to the Ministry for Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation (Minatom, 1992-2004) and the Federal Agency on Atomic Energy (Rosatom Agency, 2004-2007), themselves rooted in earlier Soviet institutions such as the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building (Sredmash, 1953-1989) and the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry (MAPI, 1989-1991). Following this consolidation, Rosatom quickly assumed a far more active international profile.12 Between 2000 and 2015, Russia accounted for roughly half of all international agreements related to nuclear power plant construction, fuel supply, and associated services, which positioned Rosatom at the center of many states’ nuclear development strategies. By the early 2020s, the corporation reported a foreign order portfolio spanning more than 50 countries.13 Within Russia’s broader energy statecraft, Rosatom is frequently presented as a “one-stop shop” that integrates reactor supply, fuel provision, project financing, workforce training, and back-end services. It is also cast as a key instrument in the broader campaign of nuclear energy diplomacy, in which the company and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinate to cultivate long-term dependencies and potential leverage over client states.14 After 2014, Western sanctions targeted Russian coal, oil, and gas far more aggressively than its nuclear sector, and nuclear trade largely remained outside the primary sanctions regime even after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which allowed nuclear cooperation to operate as a relatively low-profile channel through which Moscow could sustain influence in key regions while other parts of its energy sector became politically contentious. By 2022, this decades-long institutional development had positioned Rosatom as the dominant player in global nuclear exports, a position it leveraged even as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine transformed the geopolitical landscape.15

Market Position on the Eve of the Ukraine War

Before Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russian state-owned enterprises led by Rosatom accounted for a significant portion of the global commercial uranium enrichment services; they controlled close to half of global enrichment capacity.16 Rosatom’s role in the global nuclear sector extends well beyond these frequently cited enrichment market shares: research by Szulecki and Overland identifies up to 73 projects in 29 countries involving operating reactors, units under construction, contracted and planned new builds, research centers, and broader cooperation agreements, although many of these initiatives remain at an early stage or are non-binding, taking the form of memoranda of understanding, framework agreements, or invitations to tender rather than fully financed projects. Rosatom is widely recognized for its vertically integrated one-stop nuclear shop model, which bundles reactor construction, fuel supply, financing, and back-end services within a single commercial offer. This approach is one of Rosatom’s core competitive advantages in global nuclear energy diplomacy, especially for states that lack extensive domestic nuclear infrastructure or financing capacity.17 Furthermore, analysis by Haneklaus and co-authors indicates that Russian firms, led by Rosatom, are involved at every significant stage of the nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium production, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication. Rosatom leads the world in uranium enrichment, with a market share of about 35% to 38%, and it supplies approximately 17% to 18% of global nuclear fuel. Its model allows the company to provide a full suite of services from mining through to spent fuel management, which makes Rosatom a structural pillar of global supply rather than a niche provider. The overall market is highly competitive, with no single company matching Rosatom’s reach across all stages.18 World Nuclear Association data shows that the global uranium enrichment market is highly concentrated, with only a few firms providing services at scale. Rosatom in Russia, Urenco in the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands, Orano in France, and China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) together account for more than 95% of global enrichment capacity. Within this group, Russian firms under the Rosatom umbrella remain a dominant force in global enrichment services.19 Assessments by Third Way and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) indicate that utilities in Europe and North America have continued to purchase Russian enriched uranium and fuel assemblies after 2022, with Russia remaining a primary commercial supplier of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) and an essential source of low-enriched uranium (LEU) for several Western states, even though the United States has legislated a ban on Russian uranium imports that includes a waiver process allowing imports to continue through 2027. Pilot projects and government-backed initiatives in the United States and Europe have begun to produce limited quantities of HALEU. However, these efforts have not yet reached commercial scale, and, as of 2025, Russia remains the only global commercial supplier of HALEU, underscoring how deeply Rosatom and its fuel-cycle subsidiaries are embedded in Western nuclear supply chains.20

Impact of Sanctions and the Ukraine War

The occupation of Ukrainian nuclear facilities, most notably the Zaporizhzhya plant, and the direct involvement of Rosatom personnel in helping to maintain Russian control have sharply undermined the company’s reputation as a neutral technical partner in many Western capitals, while perceptions outside Europe remain more mixed, and several regions have continued or expanded nuclear cooperation with Russia. Rosatom’s role in supporting the occupation of Ukraine and its integration into Russia’s broader military industrial complex are now well documented and collectively raise serious questions about the corporation’s claimed neutrality and the broader geopolitical implications of its nuclear diplomacy.21 Western governments increasingly treat nuclear energy ties with Russia as a security liability rather than a routine commercial relationship. The Stimson Center notes that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its continued control of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear plant have triggered large-scale efforts across the West to reduce reliance on Russian uranium and fuel services. These dynamics have driven a series of policy measures, most notably a United States ban on imports of Russian enriched uranium that took effect in 2024, with waivers allowed until 2027. These initiatives are accelerating a broader restructuring of nuclear supply chains and markets, even though Russia still holds a substantial share of global supply.22 Furthermore, United States sanctions now cover the Russian energy sector in a way that explicitly includes nuclear power. In 2025, the United States and its allies sanctioned Russian energy-sector entities and individuals, including more than a dozen senior Rosatom officials, significantly increasing the legal and compliance risks associated with doing business with Russia’s nuclear industry.23

These measures have not expelled Russia from global nuclear commerce, but they have complicated Rosatom’s financing arrangements, strained relations with Western partners, and intensified scrutiny of its projects. RUSI characterizes Rosatom as both an integral component of the Russian weapons complex and a long-term tool of political influence through reactor exports, fuel supply arrangements, and build-own-operate projects such as the Akkuyu plant in Türkiye, which allows for Russian control in critical infrastructure for decades.24 The European Union has so far sanctioned only certain Rosatom subsidiaries because several member states still depend on Russian fuel, even as many utilities and governments pursue diversification, and Ukrainian and European advocates continue to press for direct European Union sanctions on Rosatom itself.25 The result is an environment in which Russia is a dominant supplier, with existing projects in countries such as Bangladesh, Egypt, Hungary, and Türkiye continuing to advance, while its nuclear diplomacy encounters growing resistance as Western states finance alternative fuel supply chains and warn partners that long-term nuclear cooperation with Rosatom carries rising geopolitical and sanctions-related exposure.26

Regional Differences in Russia’s Nuclear Energy Leverage

Russia’s nuclear leverage varies significantly across regions, with the sharpest contractions occurring in Europe, while partnerships in the Global South have deepened since 2022. Russia’s broader energy leverage in Europe, primarily through fossil fuel exports, has declined. However, structural dependencies on Russian nuclear fuel and related services persist, especially in states that operate Soviet era or modern Russian reactors or rely on Russian enrichment capacity. The European Commission has responded with a “Roadmap towards fully ending E.U. dependency on Russian energy,” which includes plans to phase out Russian nuclear fuel and associated services. Implementation has been gradual, with current measures focused on limiting new contracts and steadily reducing existing exposure rather than imposing an immediate cutoff. As a result, complete independence from Russian nuclear fuel is a long-term objective, and the pace and feasibility of this shift vary considerably across European Union member states due to differences in reactor technology, regulatory approaches, and available alternatives.27 The European Union member states that operate Russian-designed VVER reactors have begun to diversify their nuclear fuel supply: Framatome has taken a leading role in developing a sovereign European fuel option, signing contracts with major utilities in Hungary, Slovakia, and Czechia, while negotiations continue with operators in Bulgaria and Finland. Westinghouse already supplies fuel for some VVER 1000 units and plans to extend coverage to VVER 440 reactors, although diversification across all reactor types remains incomplete. The European Union has identified the Lingen facility as a central element of this strategy. However, a proposed joint venture between Framatome and Rosatom at the site has sparked debate, with critics warning that such cooperation could entrench, rather than genuinely reduce, Europe’s dependence on Russian nuclear technology and fuel.28 Furthermore, trade analysis by Kpler shows that the European Union continues to import some Russian nuclear materials, notably to support the 19 operating Russian-designed VVER reactors. Although there is no ban on all imports of Russian nuclear fuel, the European Union is moving forward with legislation to phase out new contracts and impose tighter limits on future purchases. VVER operators remain heavily reliant on existing TVEL fuel while Western suppliers complete qualification and delivery of replacement fuel.29

Sanctions and asset freezes have begun to constrain some of Rosatom’s flagship projects. At Türkiye’s Akkuyu plant, reporting points to a funding shortfall of roughly $7 billion, large scale workforce reductions, unpaid salaries, and the freezing of $2 billion in Russian funds by the United States Department of Justice, developments that have pushed Rosatom to concentrate resources on completing the first unit and reportedly to consider selling a 49% stake to stabilize the project. These trends do not eliminate Russian leverage in Europe, but they are reshaping it.30

Russian nuclear leverage has remained robust and, in some cases, expanded across much of the non-Western market, where Rosatom is delivering “first-of-a-kind” plants or offering integrated, state-backed packages. A 2025 Jamestown Foundation analysis estimates that Rosatom holds contracts for 40 international installations, 25 of which are already under construction, with a ten-year foreign order book valued at around $200 billion; this portfolio includes significant projects in Türkiye, Egypt, Bangladesh, Vietnam, and India, as well as smaller initiatives in Kyrgyzstan and a research and technology center in Bolivia.31 In Central Asia, Rosatom has emerged as the preferred partner for Kazakhstan after a competitive selection process that included Chinese, French, and South Korean vendors. Kazakh officials have characterized the Russian proposal as the most advantageous overall, highlighting Russia’s experience working within international consortia, its capacity to integrate equipment from a range of foreign suppliers, the provision of Russian state-backed export financing, and broader strategic and logistical considerations. Uzbekistan has similarly deepened its cooperation with Rosatom, moving from an initial framework for a large-scale nuclear power plant to a 2024 contract for six small modular reactors (SMR).32 Rosatom and the India's Department of Atomic Energy are discussing ways to deepen their nuclear partnership, including the possible construction of additional Russian-designed VVER 1200 units, with technical specifications for projects still under development; both sides are exploring further large and small-scale nuclear initiatives that would build on existing cooperation at the Kudankulam site although concrete agreements and contracts beyond the current portfolio remain in the negotiation and exploratory stages.33 Jamestown further emphasizes that Rosatom is using this growing portfolio spanning Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East to strengthen relationships with non-Western states and capitalize on a broader global nuclear revival.34

Case Studies

Egypt

Russia’s nuclear engagement with Egypt entered a new phase in 2020, when construction began on El Dabaa, the country’s first commercial nuclear power plant and Rosatom’s flagship project on the African continent. The project rests on a 2015 intergovernmental agreement and 2017 contracts for four VVER-1200 units on Egypt's Mediterranean coast, financed primarily through a $25 billion Russian state export loan that covers about 85% of projected costs, with overall investment typically estimated at around $30 billion. In 2020 and 2021, El Dabaa was still awaiting construction licenses and faced COVID-related delays. Regulators issued the Unit 1 construction permit in mid-2022, followed by approvals for units 2 through 4 in 2022 and 2023.35 First concrete for Unit 1 was poured in July 2022, and for units 2, 3, and 4 in November 2022, May 2023, and January 2024, respectively.36 Construction has advanced across all four units, marked by milestones such as the delivery and installation of core catchers, including for Unit 4 in late 2024, alongside ongoing civil works and systems installation across the site.37 By September 2025, Egypt's project director reported that more than 25,000 workers were employed at El Dabaa, with Egyptian nationals constituting the majority of the workforce. The project is on schedule for all four reactors to enter operation between 2029 and 2030.38

Financing and fuel-cycle arrangements have evolved in ways that deepen Russia's long-term role. In November 2024, Russia's State Duma ratified a protocol updating the 25 billion dollar export loan, reaffirming that it covers roughly 85% of project costs and presenting the agreement as a central pillar of broader Russo-Egyptian cooperation in nuclear energy, science, and the broader economy.39 In June 2025, President Vladimir Putin approved an amendment that allows Egypt to service the loan in Russian rubles rather than only in foreign currencies, a change that Egyptian and Russian media explicitly framed as easing Cairo's hard-currency burden while preserving the core structure of the financing package.40 Beyond the engineering, procurement, and construction contracts, the 2017 agreements and subsequent public statements indicate that Rosatom's role at El Dabaa extends across the complete reactor life cycle. The company is committed to supplying nuclear fuel for the entire operating life of the plant, initially planned for 60 years, with the option to extend to 80 or even 100 years. In addition, Rosatom will provide training and maintenance support for at least the first decade of operation and will supply both the storage facility and containers for used fuel. In early 2025, the Egyptians approved a dry-storage facility at El Dabaa, designed to hold spent fuel for up to 100 years, formalizing Russian involvement in long-term waste management and illustrating the strength of the multi-decade partnership.41

El Dabaa is critical for Egypt's energy transition and is one of Russia's most significant infrastructure undertakings in the Middle East and Africa.42 Egypt turned to Russia only after earlier efforts to secure Western support stalled, as several European and United States vendors proved unable or unwilling to meet Cairo's expectations for sovereign credit guarantees and more extensive technology transfer. Egypt also examined proposals from South Korea and China that advanced to technical cooperation agreements and preliminary bids but ultimately did not yield binding contracts. Moscow has differentiated itself by combining a large, state-backed loan with a package that grouped construction, fuel supply, personnel training, and back-end services within a single, long-term agreement.43 El Dabaa is the only nuclear power plant under active construction in Africa as of 2025, while other projects on the continent remain at the planning or preparatory stage. The plant grants Russia a durable position within Egypt's energy and infrastructure space.44

Within Egypt's nuclear sector, Russia faces little competition. Although China continues to expand its global footprint in this space, Sino-Russian competition in Egypt has yet to flare, but is anticipated in the near future. Egypt maintains nuclear cooperation agreements with China and South Korea. CNNC signed a 2015 agreement to become an official partner in Egypt's nuclear program amid discussion of a future tender for a second plant.45 Research on Africa’s nuclear landscape highlights that Rosatom’s dominant position is now facing growing competition from CNNC and Western companies, exemplified by Ghana’s strategic decision in early 2025 to select both Chinese and American vendors for its reactor deployment and Rwanda’s agreements with Canadian-German and U.S. firms to host advanced demonstration reactors. Furthermore, this contested environment is visible in South Africa’s revived procurement process, which actively solicits bids from Western and Chinese suppliers, and in Nigeria’s comprehensive 2024 agreement with CNNC that challenges Russian preeminence in West African energy infrastructure. In Egypt, however, Rosatom is the sole reactor vendor at El Dabaa, and no Chinese-built reactor project has advanced beyond memoranda or proposals. In practice, competition has so far been confined to earlier phases of bidding and diplomatic positioning, while the concrete construction, financing, fuel supply, and back-end services for Egypt's nuclear power sector are firmly anchored in the Russo-Egyptian partnership at El Dabaa.46

India

Russia remains a leading foreign vendor for large nuclear power units in India, most prominently through Rosatom's VVER-1000 reactors at the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP) in Tamil Nadu. KKNPP accounted for roughly 20% to 25% of India's installed nuclear capacity and a comparable share of its nuclear electricity generation as of mid-2024, which makes Kudankulam the largest and most significant nuclear project in the country, while additional units at the site remain under construction and sustain Russia's central role in India's nuclear expansion.47 India aims to expand nuclear power capacity to 100 gigawatts by the late 2040s and to triple its current capacity to more than 22 gigawatts by the early 2030s, relying on a mix of indigenous pressurized heavy-water reactors and imported light-water reactors. Russia is still the only foreign supplier to have commissioned reactors under India's nuclear liability regime, and recent regulatory reforms that eased liability concerns have revived negotiations with other vendors, including France's EDF and several U.S. firms, after earlier plans involving foreign partners were delayed or shelved largely due to liability and financing constraints; the revised rules are now facilitating renewed engagement with multiple suppliers. Moscow and New Delhi have framed nuclear cooperation as a pillar of their “special and privileged strategic partnership,” a relationship deeply rooted in the Soviet Union’s pivotal diplomatic and military support for India during the Cold War, most notably during the 1971 war with Pakistan, which established Moscow as a trusted partner when Western powers were often viewed with suspicion. Although Western sanctions are certainly part of India’s considerations, these pressures have not directly halted Rosatom’s projects in India; they have disrupted financing channels and supply chains.48 Six VVER-1000 units are planned for the Kudankulam facility, with units 1 and 2 already in operation and units 3 through 6 still under construction. As of late 2025, construction on units 3 and 4 was reported to be roughly 78% complete, with commissioning targeted for 2026 and 2027, respectively. However, both units have experienced significant schedule issues after their planned completion dates were postponed by several years. Cost increases for units 3 and 4 are estimated at 73%, driven in large part by domestic financing and working capital constraints, as well as delays in the delivery of Russian components, while units 5 and 6 remain at an earlier stage of construction and, as of mid-2024, had not yet recorded cost overruns on the same scale; all six units, however, have been exposed to rising costs linked to inflation and broader supply chain challenges that have affected nuclear projects worldwide.49 A 2025 joint progress update from Rosatom and India's Department of Atomic Energy reports that Unit 3 at Kudankulam has entered the pre-commissioning phase, with preparations underway for open reactor safety system tests, while Unit 4 has completed installation of its inner containment dome and steam supply system. Construction activities and equipment deliveries for units 5 and 6 are proceeding in line with the current schedule, underpinned in part by a loan of more than $3 billion from Russia's Vnesheconombank, which is subject to international sanctions, a fact that could complicate funding paths.50

India's bilateral nuclear cooperation with Russia now extends beyond Kudankulam to a broader set of initiatives, as reflected in the July 2024 Modi-Putin summit joint statement and subsequent reporting, which indicate that New Delhi and Moscow are discussing a new Russian-designed nuclear power plant based on VVER-1200 units, with a particular emphasis on localizing the design and jointly manufacturing key components in India. Technical specifications for this future station remain under development alongside ongoing negotiations on fuel supply arrangements for Kudankulam units. Additionally, both sides are examining options for collaboration on floating and land-based SMRs, as well as broader cooperation across the nuclear fuel cycle. Recent senior-level visits by Indian officials to advanced Russian nuclear facilities, including Rosatom's BREST-OD-300 fast reactor project, form part of a broader set of exchanges on closed fuel cycle technologies. However, many of these initiatives remain at exploratory and negotiation stages, with no clearly defined timelines or finalized agreements.51 India has gradually diversified its nuclear reactor fleet by supplementing domestic pressurized heavy-water reactors with imported light-water reactors, with significant projects such as Kudankulam achieving more substantive progress after 2010.52 New Delhi has expressed interest in Russian SMR offerings and has pursued several rounds of technical discussions and memoranda of understanding, yet this engagement has not evolved into a clear political commitment; Russian SMR concepts are among several international options under review, alongside proposals from other foreign suppliers, while India continues to place primary emphasis on developing its own domestic SMR designs.53

India currently does not operate Chinese-designed or have Chinese-operated nuclear power reactors, as the only foreign-supplied units in its fleet are the Russian VVER-1000 reactors. India's other reactors are mainly domestic designs, supplemented by a small group of older Western-built units, most notably the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, which comprises two boiling-water reactors supplied by General Electric that rely on imported fuel, primarily enriched uranium from Russia. However, New Delhi has pursued additional agreements for Western reactor projects in recent years; none of these units have entered operation as of late 2025.54 Persistent border disputes and recurring military tensions continue to shape the Sino-Indian relationship, significantly limiting prospects for Chinese nuclear power projects in India. These geopolitical tensions, combined with regulatory barriers and commercial risk concerns, ensure that India’s nuclear strategy remains anchored in Russian technology supplemented by domestic reactor development.55 While New Delhi does participate in a revived trilateral scientific cooperation arrangement with Moscow and Beijing, this collaboration excludes civil nuclear projects. In contrast, India's civil nuclear relationship with Russia continues to deepen through ongoing projects and new proposals.56

Iran

Russia’s involvement in Iran’s civil nuclear program has shifted from the narrow task of operating one VVER-1000 unit at Bushehr to a far broader role as the central pillar of the country’s nuclear power expansion. Bushehr-2, a Russian VVER-1000 unit, is under construction, while site works for Bushehr-3 have advanced to the point that Iranian officials anticipate first concrete in the near future, keeping both units on track for commissioning in the late 2020s. Iran also began construction in 2022 of its first nuclear-powered desalination plant at Bushehr, which further embeds Russian firms in Iranian infrastructure. In 2024, Iran initiated civil works for the Iran Hormuz plant, and in 2025, it signed a contract worth $25 billion with Rosatom to construct four VVER-1200 reactors at the site. The contractual and technical details of this agreement have not yet been fully disclosed, and implementation remains pending. However, power sector reporting and Iranian statements link the project to Tehran's long-stated objective of achieving roughly 20 GW of nuclear capacity by 2040, while Russian officials have indicated plans to build at least eight reactors in total.57 CNA's assessment of the Russo-Iranian relationship notes that civil nuclear energy, which was once a source of tension, has evolved into a growing area of cooperation, as Russia continues to supply fuel to Bushehr 1 and to construct additional units at the Bushehr site. Moscow has emerged as Iran's primary external provider of nuclear technology and infrastructure. Russia's role is crucial for Iran's nuclear power buildout, but it has not yet become the dominant architect of Iran's broader baseload power and water systems, and plans to integrate nuclear projects with large-scale water infrastructure remain unrealized.58

China has not yet translated its broader political and economic outreach into a comparable civil nuclear presence in Iran. According to World Nuclear Association data, all of Iran's operating and under-construction power reactors are either Russian-designed. Earlier concepts for deploying Chinese ACP100 units on the Makran coast remain at the proposal stage and have not progressed to construction.59 Ongoing Sino-Iranian cooperation has centered on oil, gas, petrochemicals, transport links, and conventional power, while nuclear energy remains a broad reference rather than a source of reactor projects comparable to Russia's Bushehr and Hormuz commitments.60

Iran has significantly expanded its uranium enrichment activities and curtailed transparency, culminating in the removal of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring equipment, an IAEA Board of Governors censure, and Tehran's formal assertion that the restrictions contained in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) no longer apply. These developments have unfolded alongside Russia's decision to sign new reactor agreements with Iran, use its diplomatic influence and Security Council veto to oppose the reimposition of UN sanctions, and provide economic and political support intended to soften the impact of international pressure. However, Moscow is not in a position to completely insulate Iran from sanctions or ongoing IAEA scrutiny, and China continues to be an essential diplomatic partner and potentially a future nuclear vendor. Nevertheless, China has not yet become an active commercial competitor within Iran's nuclear power sector for Russia.61

Türkiye

In Türkiye, Russia’s commercial nuclear role has shifted from prospective reactor supplier to long-term plant operator, and Rosatom now treats the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant as the centerpiece of its presence in the country. Operating under a build-own-operate model, Rosatom finances, owns, and operates the plant's four VVER 1200 units through the project company Akkuyu Nükleer. Akkuyu Nükleer was initially established as a fully Russian-controlled entity, but its founding documents permit Rosatom to sell up to 49% of its equity to other investors. For a NATO member state like Türkiye, this ownership structure is unprecedented. This relationship has attracted sustained scrutiny from Turkish and Western analysts, who highlight long-term risks to energy sovereignty, regulatory leverage, and broader political exposure to Moscow.62 The Akkuyu nuclear power project has moved from preliminary site preparation to full-scale construction of all four units, with work on the second, third, and fourth reactors initiated between 2020 and 2022, the first nuclear fuel delivered in April 2023, and commissioning activities for Unit 1 now underway, while the start of electricity generation is targeted for 2026, contingent on the successful completion of testing and the receipt of all required regulatory approvals.63 Turkish authorities estimate that once all four units are in operation, Akkuyu is projected to provide up to 10% of the country's electricity, depending on future demand and operating conditions.64 Ankara has formalized a target of approximately 20 GW of nuclear capacity by 2050, signaling that Akkuyu is intended to serve as the first pillar of a significantly larger nuclear program rather than a one-off flagship project.65

Akkuyu has become an example of the risks that accompany deep nuclear interdependence with Russia. However, there is relationship friction threatening to erode Moscow’s grip on this part of the energy sector as disputes between Rosatom and its Turkish contractor, along with Rosatom's threat to sue Siemens over delays in delivering key equipment, have illustrated how sanctions pressure, financing constraints, and supply-chain turbulence can slow construction and strain relations with both Turkish and Western partners.66 Russia's ownership of the plant, combined with Türkiye's dependence on Russian technology, labor, and fuel services, provides Moscow with durable leverage over the Turkish grid and has intensified concerns within NATO about a "nuclear grip" that echoes earlier patterns of gas dependence.67 These concerns became explicit in late 2025, when Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar told parliament that Türkiye will be entirely reliant on Rosatom subsidiary TVEL for uranium fuel at Akkuyu, marking the first public acknowledgment by Ankara that its inaugural nuclear project has created a strategic dependency.68

Ankara's experience with the Akkuyu project has played an essential role in shaping its approach to future nuclear plans, as has been the case with the proposed Sinop power station. Until mid-2024, industry analysis and official reporting generally treated Rosatom as the leading candidate for the Sinop station. By late 2025, however, government statements and observable market activity suggest a more competitive space in which U.S. and South Korean firms are actively vying for the project, and Ankara has not yet announced a final decision.69 Turkish officials have been openly maintaining parallel negotiations with several suppliers, including South Korea and the United States.70 In October 2025, NucNet noted that Türkiye was considering a trilateral model involving the United States and South Korea at Sinop rather than a purely Russian project, while Nordic Monitor highlighted that the new U.S.-Türkiye civil nuclear memorandum of understanding is explicitly framed as an alternative to repeating the Akkuyu arrangement.71 Turkish officials quoted by Nordic Monitor now stress that "future nuclear plants will not follow a single-country model," indicating that Rosatom has effectively shifted from default partner to one competitor among several at Sinop.72

Russia has been absent from discussions on new energy cooperation considerations as Ankara looks to diversify. Türkiye's move toward a more diversified supplier base is even clearer at the proposed third plant in Thrace, on the European side of Türkiye. Energy officials report that Ankara is in advanced talks with China's State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC) for this site.73 A recent 2025 memorandum on civil nuclear cooperation points to Turkish efforts to involve the United States more deeply in its nuclear planning. Turkish and U.S. officials have pointed to joint work on both large reactors and SMRs. U.S. diplomats explicitly presented the partnership as a means to reduce Türkiye's dependence on Russia.74 Additionally, South Korea, while already central to discussions at Sinop, is framed as a technologically credible and politically acceptable partner that can collaborate with U.S. firms. Taken together, these developments mean that compared with 2020, Russia's nuclear footprint in Türkiye has deepened at the operational level through Akkuyu but narrowed in scope. Rosatom retains a significant, long-term commercial foothold, yet its ability to shape Türkiye's broader nuclear trajectory now faces active competition from U.S., Chinese, and South Korean offerings.75

Hungary

The Paks II nuclear project has shifted from a prolonged period of delay to a more concrete implementation phase marked by active construction. Hungary submitted the construction license application in July 2020, and in August 2022, the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority approved two VVER-1200 units; groundworks began in 2023 and continued through 2025, establishing the technical and regulatory foundation for a planned first concrete pour in early 2026 and an anticipated grid connection in the early 2030s. These steps have consolidated Rosatom's role as the principal supplier of large-scale reactor projects, with new-build implementation underway in the European Union.76 The Paks II project is grounded in a 2014 intergovernmental agreement under which Russia extended a state loan of up to 10 billion euros intended to finance roughly 80% of the estimated project cost. Revised loan conditions embed a long-term dependence on Russian credit that will persist well into the 2030s. The two Paks II units are planned to use Rosatom's VVER-1200 reactor design, which at present relies primarily on fuel supplied by Rosatom's TVEL. However, Hungary has sought to dilute its reliance on Russian fuel by securing alternative suppliers. In 2025, Budapest concluded contracts with Western firms, including Westinghouse and Framatome, to provide VVER-compatible fuel assemblies beginning in 2027 to 2028. This diversification reduces but does not entirely remove the longer-term risk of Russian technological and fuel-supply dependencies.77 Furthermore, efforts have been made for the Paks II project to incorporate Western partners. A French-German consortium led by Framatome and Siemens Energy is contracted to supply the specialized instrumentation and control system; however, repeated delays linked to German export-licensing decisions have prompted Hungary and Rosatom to explore workarounds, including the potential establishment of a Siemens subsidiary in Hungary to deliver equipment from within the country. These arrangements show how Moscow's nuclear diplomacy pairs Russian state financing with E.U. suppliers to anchor a Russian-designed plant in an E.U. member state and, in the process, turn German and E.U. export-control decisions into recurring sites of political negotiation. Hungary represents a unique case of a European Union member state with strong Russia ties even beyond the nuclear sector, as Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s government has leveraged its long-term gas contracts and political alignment with the Kremlin to shield the Paks II project from EU sanctions, framing the nuclear expansion as a sovereign necessity while effectively anchoring Russian influence within critical European infrastructure for decades.78

Paks II has become contested within the European Union's legal framework and sanctions debate. The project initially benefited from a 2017 European Commission decision approving Hungarian state aid and addressing earlier procurement concerns; however, in September 2025, the Court of Justice of the European Union annulled that approval, ruling that the Commission had not verified whether the directly awarded construction contract with the Russian contractor complied with E.U. public procurement rules.79 The judgment obliges Brussels to re-examine both the state-aid and procurement dimensions of the project, even as Budapest and Rosatom maintain that construction will continue.80 Paks II has emerged as a central example in a broader European effort to extend sanctions to Rosatom and the Russian nuclear sector while attempting to decouple from those Russian entities. Despite the interconnectedness of Russia's civilian nuclear industry and its military apparatus, E.U. sanctions packages have largely avoided direct restrictions on Rosatom or on Russian nuclear fuel supplies. However, Paks II is frequently portrayed as a "Trojan horse" that locks an E.U. member state into long-term dependence on Russian financing, reactor technology, and fuel services, intensifying concerns about energy security vulnerabilities and the geopolitical risks associated with sustained Russian leverage within the E.U. market.81 An 2025 analysis by Poland's Centre for Eastern Studies further describes how Hungarian diplomacy helped secure a United States license that eased sanctions on Gazprombank for Paks II-related transactions and how renewed German acceptance of Siemens Energy's role again unblocked the project, characterizing these outcomes as a breach in the Western sanctions front that sends a favorable signal to Moscow. Paks II is an example of how Russia's nuclear energy presence in Hungary has become a persistent source of friction within the E.U. over energy security.82

European Union

Russia's role in the European Union's nuclear sector has become more visible and politically contested, especially regarding fuel supply and associated services for Russian-designed VVER reactors. E.U. member states continue to depend on external providers at multiple stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, and Russian suppliers retain a significant position in that space. Forum Energii estimates that, in 2023, roughly 20% of the E.U.'s uranium ore imports and about 24% of its contracted enrichment services originated from Russian entities. Globally, Russia remains the leading supplier of enrichment capacity, accounting for an estimated 45% of the world's enriched uranium.83 Moreover, 19 of the European Union's 101 operating reactors are Soviet-designed VVER units that were historically dependent on Russia, but now most have successfully diversified their fuel supply chains to Western partners like Westinghouse and Framatome.84

Until the geopolitical conditions of recent years, the European Union's exposure to Russian nuclear industry products had been intensifying, even as policymakers sought to reduce this dependence more actively. Forum Energii estimates that E.U. imports of nuclear industry products from Russia reached about 720 million euros in 2022, a 22% increase from 2021, and NucNet reports that uranium deliveries from Russia to E.U. VVER operators increased by about 72% in 2023 as utilities stockpiled fuel ahead of potential restrictions. These dynamics underscore the resilience of commercial ties in the absence of E.U.-wide sanctions on Rosatom, despite its role in supporting Russia's war effort. However, several member states have nonetheless adopted their own restrictive policies. Yet, bilateral contracts with Rosatom, especially in Central Europe, continue to advance, highlighting the fragmented nature of the E.U.'s approach to nuclear supply chain security.85

Rosatom's portfolio positions the corporation as a dominant supplier of new-build capacity in key emerging markets. European component manufacturers, including turbine producers, are closely integrated into this export pipeline and depend on Rosatom-backed projects for a significant share of their business. This is especially the case in Central and Eastern Europe, where Russian-designed plants remain prominent. The reality of commercial interdependence helps explain why the European Union has not imposed sanctions on the nuclear sector comparable to those on Russian oil, gas, and coal, because such measures would directly affect European firms and disrupt ongoing projects without an immediate remedy.86

Policy debates within the European Union have moved from treating nuclear cooperation with Russia as a narrow technical issue to viewing it as a strategic vulnerability. Forum Energii characterizes Rosatom as a political corporation at the heart of Russia's "carrot and stick" energy diplomacy and argues that dependence on its services exposes E.U. states to potential blackmail across the fuel cycle, prompting more member states to frame nuclear decoupling from Russia as a security priority.87 DiXi Group's assessment of the European Commission's Roadmap toward ending Russian energy imports concludes that proposals to phase out Russian nuclear materials alongside gas and oil have been only partially incorporated into the European Union planning. The roadmap calls for bans on new contracts with Rosatom for uranium, enriched uranium, and related nuclear materials. It requires member states to develop national strategies to phase out Russian nuclear inputs. The unwinding of existing joint ventures is ongoing, and current analyses suggest that the complete elimination of Russian nuclear imports will likely extend into the 2030s.88 Brussels now links diversification of nuclear fuel supply to broader climate and energy security objectives, treating Russian fuel as a single-supplier risk that should be reduced.89 Hungary's pursuit of the Paks II expansion is a notable exception that preserves a significant partnership with Rosatom within the E.U., while, otherwise, European policy attention is increasingly focused on ending dependence on Russia.90

Europe's principal counterweight to Russian influence in the nuclear sector rests on U.S. and European suppliers rather than on Chinese firms. The Clean Air Task Force (CATF) states that manufactured fuel for VVER-440 and VVER-1000 reactors is the most significant vulnerability and highlights alternative vendors, such as Westinghouse and Framatome, as evidence that technically viable non-Russian options now exist for these reactor types. Fuel compatibility for other VVER designs is under development, and full commercialization of alternative fuel across all E.U. VVER units has not yet been achieved.91 Westinghouse's APIS initiative, launched in 2023 and co-funded under Horizon Europe and Euratom, brings together European utilities, fuel manufacturers, and research organizations to design, license, and scale a fully European VVER fuel supply for reactors in the E.U. and Ukraine, to reduce dependence on Russian VVER fuel and establish a fuel design independent of Russian intellectual property.92 The European Union is comparatively well-positioned in enrichment, since Urenco and Orano together provide about two-thirds of enrichment services within the E.U. Both firms are expanding capacity through new investments and targeted policy support. These developments could reduce Russia's leverage in the fuel cycle. For now, Russia remains the dominant actor in the global enrichment market, and the European Union's ability to entirely displace Russian supply across all reactor types will depend on sustained investment and several years of additional development.93 Russia's main competitors in the E.U. nuclear space are U.S. and European firms backed by E.U. policy, not Chinese vendors, since diversification initiatives consistently highlight companies such as Westinghouse, Framatome, and E.U.-owned enrichment companies as preferred partners.94

China

China presents a paradox for Russian nuclear diplomacy, functioning as both a major commercial partner and an emerging strategic competitor. Beijing’s expanding nuclear capabilities rest in part on Russian technology and fuel contracts. Yet, China’s domestic reactor program and growing export ambitions position it as Russia’s primary long-term rival in global nuclear markets. China’s civil nuclear program has expanded rapidly, with installed capacity rising to roughly 57 GW by late 2023 and around 61 GW by the end of 2024; however, it is now clear that it will fall short of the 14th Five-Year Plan goal of 70 GW of operating capacity in 2025, with that milestone more likely to be reached around 2026. World Nuclear Association reporting indicates that Beijing has become largely self-sufficient in reactor design and construction, supported by a maturing domestic supply chain and a policy framework that clearly prioritizes the development and international diffusion of its own Hualong One and related reactor designs. China is also pursuing a closed fuel-cycle strategy through pilot and demonstration projects in reprocessing and fast reactors; as of 2025, however, these initiatives remain at a pre-commercial stage and have not yet been deployed widely across the civilian fleet.95 Russian technology is important but non-dominant. China currently operates four Russian-designed VVER reactors and has four additional units under construction, which together account for only a small fraction of a fleet that now includes 58 operating commercial units and dozens more under construction. Beijing has expanded domestic uranium production, acquired equity stakes in foreign mines, and invested in its own conversion and enrichment capacity. Russian technology and services nonetheless shaped earlier stages of this trajectory, including technical input into the Hanzhong and Lanzhou facilities and historical enrichment supply contracts with the Russian nuclear fuel supplier, Tenex. More recent expansion has been driven primarily by domestic capabilities and accompanied by a steady decline in reliance on Russian enrichment. While the Sino-Russian relationship in the nuclear energy space is significant, Beijing is systematically consolidating its position as an autonomous nuclear energy actor.96

Russia's role in China's nuclear sector has become concentrated in a specific group of projects, and its overall share has diminished amid China's broader reactor fleet and continued drive for domestically produced technology. At the core of this cooperation is the package for four VVER-1200 units at Tianwan and Xudabao.97 Russia continues to provide technical support, supply selected key components, and conduct regular maintenance and training activities for the Tianwan and Xudabao projects, and construction is on track, with commissioning currently targeted for 2026-2027.98

China leads globally in new reactor construction starts, driven primarily by its domestic Hualong One program. However, its export portfolio remains modest compared to Russia’s, concentrated in Pakistan.99 China's strategy for global competitiveness in nuclear power shows that cooperation with Russia is significant but accounts for only a modest share of each country's broader nuclear portfolio. China's current phase of nuclear expansion is rooted in its own reactor designs, such as the Hualong One.100

Russian reactor technology and fuel supply have supported China's near-term energy and climate objectives.101 Russian-built units at Tianwan, including both the earlier VVER-1000 reactors and the newer VVER-1200s, provide reliable power and have given Chinese operators greater experience with more modern large reactors. Long-term fuel contracts and associated technology transfer from TVEL have enabled domestic fabrication of VVER fuel at Yibin.102 Russia also supplies fuel for China's CFR-600 fast reactor, and in 2023, Moscow and CNNC concluded a program covering fast reactors, uranium-plutonium fuel, and fuel-cycle closure that directly reinforces Beijing's stated ambition to expand fast-neutron reactor deployment and move toward a closed fuel cycle. China's closed fuel cycle, including full-scale plutonium fuel fabrication and recycling, nevertheless remains under development as of 2025 and is not yet fully operational, with commercial-scale deployment and effective fuel-cycle closure still anticipated to unfold over the coming decade rather than in the immediate term.103 Russia has recently reaffirmed its commitment to helping China surpass the United States in nuclear capacity and influence in nuclear exports.104

The Sino-Russian relationship generates substantial short and medium-term gains for Russia but also introduces strategic risks over time. Multi-reactor construction contracts at Tianwan and Xudabao, long-term fuel-supply and service agreements, and specialized fuel sales for fast reactors provide Rosatom with predictable revenue streams and an opportunity to showcase Russian technology in a prominent market at a moment when sanctions constrain access to many Western markets.105 The partnership also deepens political alignment between Moscow and Beijing, as both governments present Russian nuclear technology and services as competitive and reliable and cast their cooperation as a challenge to U.S. leadership in the global nuclear export arena.106 However, helping China to master advanced reactor and fuel-cycle technologies effectively nurtures a major future competitor. World Nuclear Association assessments suggest that China's planned conversion and enrichment capacity could ultimately support on the order of 180 GWe, and Beijing is steadily moving toward greater self-sufficiency in enrichment, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing while marketing Hualong-based projects internationally under its own brand. Collaboration on fast reactors and plutonium-capable fuel for the CFR-600 has also attracted sustained scrutiny from Western experts.107

Global Competition in Nuclear Energy

China and Russia effectively account for nearly all reactor construction starts worldwide. Between 2020 and 2024, more than 80% of reactors entering construction were based on Chinese or Russian designs, with most projects located in China and the remainder either in Russia or built using Russian VVER technology. China now accounts for nearly half of global nuclear capacity under construction and has emerged as the fastest builder of new reactors. Russia is an important actor in large export projects backed by state-supported financing. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has not fundamentally disrupted this shared dominance. However, some states, notably in North America and Europe, have become more inclined to explore Chinese or Western alternatives due to the increasing geopolitical toxicity surrounding Russian firms, although many projects in the Global South involving Russian participation continue to advance.108

Russia's structural advantages in the global nuclear sector stem from its long record of exporting standardized VVER reactors, its partially vertically integrated fuel-cycle capabilities, and its capacity to offer "full package" arrangements that combine reactor design, construction, fuel supply, workforce training, and often sovereign or quasi-sovereign financing. This model is attractive to newcomer states, including many in Africa, that face persistent barriers to international capital and lack in-house technical expertise. Recent geopolitical developments, including sanctions and a broader trend toward diversification of nuclear fuel supply, have encouraged some governments to reduce their exposure to Russian fuel and financing, and a growing number of proposed projects are either stalling or failing to advance due to these evolving political and financial constraints.109

China's position in the global nuclear sector is centered on its large and rapidly growing domestic reactor fleet, which by 2025 will constitute the world's largest construction pipeline. Its Hualong One reactor has delivered notable cost advantages in domestic builds and sits at the center of Beijing's nuclear export strategy. However, international deployment of the Hualong One remains limited, with Pakistan as the primary recipient, while most of China's export projects remain at a preliminary stage. Critical components and technologies in the Chinese supply chain continue to rely on foreign suppliers, and the global competitiveness of Chinese designs has been uneven, shaped by regional political dynamics, financing terms, and varying regulatory requirements.110 However, Beijing frequently links nuclear cooperation to broader Belt and Road investments in power grids, ports, and critical minerals in Latin America and across the Global South. This comes at a time when Russian nuclear projects are increasing exposure to sanction efforts and other geopolitical risks, especially in Western or Western-aligned markets. This is an opportunity for Beijing. The Chinese nuclear industry is gaining traction in emerging markets such as Pakistan, Argentina, and parts of Southeast Asia, but faces persistent political, financial, security, and transparency concerns. Most Chinese export projects remain in early, slow-moving, or uncertain stages, and regional political dynamics have deflated overall Chinese competitiveness.111

In Central Asia, Sino-Russian competition in the nuclear sector is often complementary rather than strictly zero-sum. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have both selected Rosatom as the contractor for their first large nuclear power plants, with construction expected to begin in the coming years. However, there are signs of shifting influence and priorities in the region, as Russia's direct stake in Kazakhstan's uranium mining has declined. In December 2024, Rosatom-affiliated Uranium One divested significant holdings in regional mining ventures, and Chinese state entities acquired these assets. Stuck between these two powers, Central Asian governments are pursuing a strategy to balance external influence and avoid excessive reliance on either Moscow or Beijing. However, in these early stages of development, long-term dependencies on foreign technology, fuel, and financing remain difficult to avoid. Most of the associated projects are still in the initial phase, with early construction just beginning and projected operational dates extending well into the 2030s.112

In South Asia, the civilian nuclear market has evolved into spheres of influence. Chinese firms now dominate Pakistan's program, with recent Hualong One projects, while Russia is the leading supplier for India's Kudankulam site and Bangladesh's Rooppur project. While Russian and Chinese suppliers gain political and economic leverage within their specific markets with little to no displacement, both actors nevertheless compete for broader regional influence and the next generation of contracts.113

In Latin America, Russia's energy footprint is limited and concentrated in a few countries, while China has emerged as a major actor in oil, renewable energy, and critical minerals. Chinese firms now occupy a dominant position in infrastructure, trade, and resource extraction. This position could give Beijing an advantage if the region moves toward expanded nuclear energy goals. Argentina serves as the central example of the challenges its nuclear energy diplomacy faces in South America. Despite signing a contract in 2022 for a Chinese-supplied Hualong One reactor at Atucha, the project has encountered repeated delays driven by financing disagreements and, more recently, the Milei administration’s shift toward austerity and privatization. Russian talks with Argentina have also stalled. However, Russia continues to exercise influence in politically aligned countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, and Bolivia; there has yet to be any serious demand for Russian nuclear services in the region, and any significant new wave of nuclear construction would hinge on regulatory decisions, financing conditions, and shifting political preferences. The reality is that relatively few governments are currently committed to large-scale nuclear projects. China's strong position in renewables and broader infrastructure does not automatically translate into future dominance in nuclear power.114

In Europe and its broader neighborhood, Rosatom is the central supplier for flagship projects such as Hungary's Paks II project and Türkiye's Akkuyu plant, where construction is underway, and completion is expected within the next several years. Türkiye is also in discussions with Chinese firms and other potential partners regarding a third nuclear power station, although no final agreement has been reached. Ankara is deliberately negotiating with a diverse group of suppliers, including Russia, China, the United States, and South Korea, to expand its options and improve its negotiating leverage.115

In Africa, Rosatom remains the predominant nuclear exporter, serving as the contractor for Egypt's El Dabaa plant and maintaining a broad portfolio of cooperation agreements with countries such as Niger and Ethiopia. However, most of these agreements are still at an early stage and have not yet translated into a large number of active construction projects. The United States and its European partners are attempting to re-establish a role in the African nuclear market, but their engagement is limited. China has emerged as a secondary yet growing actor whose nuclear ambitions are often embedded within broader infrastructure and mining initiatives; however, it has not yet matched Rosatom's record of project delivery on the continent. Hungary represents a unique case of a European Union member state with strong Russia ties even beyond the nuclear sector, as Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s government has leveraged its long-term gas contracts and political alignment with the Kremlin to shield the Paks II project from EU sanctions, effectively anchoring Russian influence within critical European infrastructure for decades while utilizing nuclear diplomacy to signal ideological support for Moscow. Many African governments are engaging with multiple suppliers to hedge against political and commercial risks and secure more favorable terms. However, the scope of genuine diversification is constrained and is heavily shaped by regional politics, financial capacity, and broader geopolitical alignments.116

Conclusion

Russia’s civil nuclear sector has proven more resilient to Western pressure than its fossil fuel exports, sustaining Moscow’s geopolitical influence even as sanctions mount. Rosatom’s model has helped Moscow build dependencies, increase influence, and establish reliable revenue streams for years. Assessments of Rosatom’s global portfolio underscore its leading role in reactor exports, its substantial share of global uranium conversion and enrichment capacity, and the scale of its foreign orders. Recent sanctions and broader geopolitical pressures, however, have begun to complicate the execution and financing of new projects, which, in turn, constrain Moscow’s ability to translate commercial nuclear contracts into durable channels of political influence as readily as in the past.117

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow’s nuclear leverage has eroded in uneven ways across regions. In much of the Global South, Rosatom has continued to sign new cooperation agreements and advance large-scale projects in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, often relying on state-backed finance and bundled service offerings that remain attractive where Western engagement is limited or fragmented. However, European policymakers have pursued a strategy to reduce dependence on Russian nuclear energy firms and services. This process continues to be gradual as dependencies persist and cooperation continues. The continued operation of VVER reactor fleets within the European Union and ongoing long-term projects such as Hungary’s Paks II ensure that Russian involvement will continue to be significant in the near future, leaving Europe in a situation in which diversification efforts and fuel stockpiling advance alongside reliance on Russian nuclear services.118

Contemporary nuclear energy geopolitics is defined by an uneasy mix of deepening Sino-Russian cooperation, limited but growing indirect competition between them, and renewed efforts by the U.S. and its allies to rebuild their own fuel-cycle capacity. The overwhelming majority of new reactor construction since 2020 has relied on Chinese or Russian designs, with China leading global net capacity growth and Russia maintaining a strong position in large international projects. States such as Türkiye are deliberately inviting competition among major suppliers, including China, Russia, France, and South Korea, to strengthen their energy security and bargaining position. For policymakers, this suggests that Russian nuclear leverage will remain significant in the near term but can be progressively reduced through steps such as diversifying fuel and service providers, developing credible alternative financing mechanisms, and supporting recipient states as they pursue more balanced and transparent cooperation frameworks. Whether Western fuel diversification efforts can meaningfully constrain Rosatom’s leverage in the next decade is an open question, contingent on specific regional policy and economic dynamics and global geopolitical conditions.119