Chad Lawhorn | October 12, 2023

The Evolution of Russian Nuclear Doctrine:

An analysis of the factors that shaped the Nuclear Weapons Doctrines of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, and what that means for Arms Control in the Present

Abstract: Understanding the forces that shape Russian nuclear weapons doctrine is crucial for global stability and security in an ever-changing geopolitical landscape. Russia's nuclear doctrine has shifted from focusing on maintaining large nuclear stockpiles to modernization, flexibility, and technological innovation since the final years of the Soviet Union. In the Putin era, Russia has become increasingly aggressive, as reflected in its nuclear strategies and doctrine. This paper will analyze Moscow's nuclear weapons doctrine by examining a non-exhaustive list of factors that have shaped the Soviet Union's and Russian Federation's doctrines from the late Soviet era to the current policies under President Vladimir Putin, as well as the implications of these policies for arms control efforts. The research focuses on three distinct periods: the final decades of the Soviet Union (1970-1991), the transitional period under President Boris Yeltsin, and the modern era under Vladimir Putin.

Introduction

Nuclear weapons are the backbone of Russian security and military culture, and as this reliance strengthens, the hopes of robust arms control programs diminish. Without a convincing conventional deterrent, Russia turned to its nuclear arsenal to project strength. Russia's nuclear doctrine has undergone continuous evolution to address various external and internal strategic realities. Russia's nuclear weapons doctrine has undergone significant changes since the late Soviet era. The country has shifted from maintaining large stockpiles of nuclear weapons to smaller arsenals, with an increasing focus on low-yield tactical nuclear weapons. This evolution stems from technological advancements and strategic recalibrations in response to economic constraints and geopolitical realities. This poses new challenges and opportunities for global security, highlighting the need to reassess existing international strategic frameworks and future arms control efforts (Colby, 2016; Kazi & Singh, 2023; Sokov, 2011; Wachs, 2022). 

Between 1970 and 1991, the Soviet Union's nuclear doctrine was primarily aimed at achieving geopolitical leverage, bolstering military options, ensuring credible second-strike capabilities, and maintaining strategic parity with NATO states, most notably the United States. The Soviet Union sought to maintain the threat of mutually assured destruction as a credible reality (CRS, 2022; Singh, 2023). However, several strategic arms reduction efforts since the 1960s have drastically reshaped the strategic arms landscape and nuclear weapon doctrines, most notably in the 1980s and early 1990s (CFR, 2023; Gottemoeller, 2022). 

Boris Yeltsin inherited a scattered arsenal entangled in the complexities of the emergence of newly independent states (Allison, 2012). The new Russian state experienced a decline in military and strategic capabilities, rendering it a weaker strategic competitor than the United States, its chief geopolitical rival. Doctrinal changes during the Yeltsin era laid the foundation for further evolution and a deeper reliance on nuclear weapons in the Putin era (Allison, 2012; Shoumikhin, 2011; Singh, 2023). 

President Putin has adopted a more adversarial approach toward Russia's role in the world, including the use of its nuclear power for geopolitical coercion (Blank, 2011; Singh, 2023; Wachs, 2022). Under Putin's rule, Russia has disappointed in the context of strategic arms control efforts. Russia has been moving away from strategic arms negotiations and toward increased proliferation, more potent technology, and a more aggressive doctrine (CRS, 2022; Rumer, 2023; Singh, 2023; Sokov, 2011). Russia views nuclear weapons as the only genuine guarantee of the Russian state's survival (Herspring, 2011; Kazi & Singh, 2023; Sky News, 2023; Sokov, 2011). 

Russia has shifted its strategic focus towards smaller, more versatile arsenals, moving away from large stockpiles to maintain non-strategic nuclear forces, as well as more powerful, modern warheads and missile systems. Russia's increasing emphasis on non-strategic nuclear forces and low-yield tactical nuclear weapons is one of the most noteworthy developments in recent times (CIA, 1983; Cranny-Evans & Kaushal, 2022; CRS, 2022; Kaur, 2023). 

The Kremlin's aggressive rhetoric on the use of nuclear weapons has raised global concerns, especially now as international arms control and non-proliferation treaties expire or erode and diplomatic discourse stalls. Russia's aggressive posture and new technologies pose new challenges and threats to the global security architecture and the future of arms control efforts (Binnendijk et al., 2022; Courtney & Klotz, 2023; Peleschuk, 2023; Wachs, 2022).

The Soviet Era

The Cold War era saw the buildup of massive nuclear arsenals by the Soviet Union and the United States. These massive stockpiles resulted from a nuclear arms race between the two superpowers on either side of a bipolar world. These arsenals aimed to provide strategic deterrence, the balance of power, and security guarantees (CACNP, 2023; CIA, 1973; CRS, 2022; Metcalfe, 2022; Singh, 2023). The Soviet nuclear weapons arsenal reached its zenith in the 1980s with an estimated stockpile of 40,000 strategic and tactical warheads (CACNP, 2023). In the final two decades preceding the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Soviet nuclear capabilities underwent significant changes, with technological advancements, internal politics, and geopolitics shaping the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons doctrine (CFR, 2023; CRS, 2022; Goure, 1990; Jones, 2021; Singh, 2023). 

Leonid Brezhnev dominated the Soviet era. First coming into power in the 1960s, Leonid Brezhnev worked to reduce tensions with the United States, reshaped the Soviet nuclear doctrine, and engaged in significant arms control diplomacy (Byron, 2010; Husain, 1977; Singh, 2023). During Leonid Brezhnev's leadership, the Soviet Union prioritized achieving a strategic balance with the United States. The Soviets developed a doctrine focused on robust strategic deterrence, which included advancements in missile and warhead technology, as well as forward-deployed missile systems. Eventually, Brezhnev engaged in arms control dialogues with the United States (CRS, 2022; Schmemann, 1981; Singh, 2023). It was reported during the Brezhnev era that the Soviet nuclear forces maintained a relaxed strategic readiness, indicating a lack of concern over an attack by the United States and its NATO partners (CIA, 1973; Singh, 2023). However, tensions began to flare again with the collapse of Détente between 1979 and 1980 (McMahon, 2021).

Soviet Era: 1970s

The nuclear doctrine of the Soviet Union in the early 1970s centered on strategic deterrence, aimed at achieving nuclear parity with the United States and maintaining a robust second-strike capability (CIA, 1973; CRS, 2022; Nikitin & Oznobishchev, 2008). The Soviet Union accepted the idea of mutually assured destruction (MAD). The Soviet Union accepted this deterrence model and planned strategic nuclear forces around the concept of total destruction. The idea was that nuclear war could be prevented if neither side could expect to survive a full-scale nuclear exchange. However, the MAD equilibrium could be destabilized by any number of new offensive or defensive technologies (Goure, 2011; Hines et al., 1995; Metcalfe, 2022; Singh, 2023). 

In the early 1970s, the Soviet Union faced technological limitations (CIA, 1973; Cole, 1999; Hines et al., 1995). The United States was the first to introduce the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) technology, but the Soviets developed and deployed their MIRVs a few years later. However, for a time, the Soviet Union lacked a credible preemptive first-strike capability, certainly in the context of counterforce (CACNP, 2021; CIA, 1973; CSIS, 2021b). MIRV technology increased payload capacity, allowing a single missile to deliver multiple warheads to different targets or even a single target (CACNP, 2021; CRS, 2022). 

Entering service in the mid-1970s, the first Soviet MIRV-capable missile was the UR-100. This missile could also carry a powerful single warhead. The missile significantly enhanced Soviet capabilities, and its subsequent variants have played significant roles in Soviet and Russian nuclear doctrine (CSIS, 2021b). The Soviet Union developed MIRVs primarily to maintain strategic parity with the United States and diversify its strike options. Additionally, these were developed in response to advances in American missile defense systems (CACNP, 2021; Singh, 2023). MIRVs provided the Soviet Union with an enhanced second-strike capability by increasing payload survivability, expanding its nuclear strategic stockpile, and improving targeting options. Moscow also utilized this advancement to provide additional political leverage in an increasingly complex arms control environment and enhance its bargaining power on the geopolitical stage (CRS, 2022; Singh, 2023). The deployment of MIRVs meant the Soviet leadership could finally plan beyond the second-strike and countervalue attacks; counterforce strategies were now a part of the doctrine at the strategic level. With more warheads and increased payload survivability, they had more targeting options and could simultaneously target multiple assets. For instance, instead of targeting a single city, they could target multiple missile installations, airfields, and command and control centers to turn off the enemy's nuclear capabilities. MIRVs made entire categories of nuclear weapons more potent (CACNP, 2021; Correll, 2005; CRS, 2022; Herspring, 2011; Shoumikhin, 2011). 

In the mid-1970s, the Soviet doctrine paid significant attention to the European theater, deploying intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) that could target Western Europe. This led to tension within the NATO alliance and eventually to the INF Treaty in the late 1980s (AVC, 1987; CIA, 1983). The deployment of INF by the Soviet Union extended deterrence by placing European NATO forces and territories within striking range. This was seen as a counterbalance to the American nuclear presence in Europe, aimed at deterring a NATO attack and allowing for a flexible response to potential threats. It reflected a move towards achieving a balance of power with the United States and its allies through a credible second-strike capability, which was integral to the concept of MAD (Kimball, 2019; Cranny-Evans & Kaushal, 2022; Hines et al., 1995; Lewis, 1980; Metcalfe, 2022).

In addition to deploying intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) to the European theater, Soviet doctrine called for tactical nuclear weapons to complement the forward deployment of troops in Europe, preemption of a first-strike by the United States, and as a tool for limited nuclear engagements, partly to offset NATO's conventional technological and tactical advantages and provide flexible response capabilities during conventional military actions. By the 1970s, Soviet doctrine had more formally incorporated tactical nuclear weapons in a European conflict scenario. Tactical nuclear weapons played a crucial role in defending these advanced positions and were integral to the Soviet Union's overall deterrence goals (Cranny-Evans & Kaushal, 2022; FAS, 2000c; Hines et al., 1995; UCS, 2022). Both tactical nuclear weapons and IRBMs could be deployed in several ways. Tactical nuclear weapons added great depth to the Soviet Union's battlefield options. This weapon category can be launched by conventional artillery, mounted on short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM), delivered by air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM), or launched from fixed or road-mobile systems, among other methods. These weapon categories led to aviation and road-mobile delivery systems being significant components of Soviet nuclear doctrine (Cranny-Evans & Kaushal, 2022; Lewis, 1980; Thomas-Noone, 2016; UCS, 2022).

 The 1970s witnessed advancements in ballistic missile technology, including specific models of the RT-2 missile, which was first developed in the late 1960s. The rocket had a far-reaching impact on Soviet nuclear doctrine as it was a missile that could be delivered from a road-mobile vehicle. Mobile missile systems were less vulnerable to a first-strike attack, providing a more secure second-strike capability. This contributed to the Soviet Union's confidence in nuclear deterrence (Acton, 2013; Dillow, 2014; FAS, 2000a; Rodriguez, 2019). The decade additionally saw the deployment of faster and more capable Tupolev strategic bombers, such as the Tu-22M, which added strategic and tactical depth to Soviet nuclear doctrine at the theater level, expanding the options the Soviets could include in their nuclear weapons strategies. The Tu-22M could be used in both the role of tactical or strategic bomber and had an incredible range, making it a potent threat to conventional forces and as a second-strike platform, adding another layer to the Soviet Union's nuclear triad, which already included land-based missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) as part of their second-strike and preemption strategies within their doctrine (FAS, 2000b; Stemple, 1999; Warner III, 1989). Weapon systems were not the only technology that shaped Soviet nuclear doctrine; satellites and other non-weapon technology also influenced the Soviet Union's strategic doctrinal framework.

Although introduced in the early decades, the 1970s witnessed significant advances in reconnaissance, communications, early warning satellites, and ground-based radar technology, including the Oko satellites and Dnestr-M radar systems. These improvements enhanced the accuracy and timeliness of the intelligence that the Soviet Union could gather, thereby making its nuclear capabilities more precise and efficient. These systems would continue to be improved in the subsequent decades (Erästö & Raju, 2023; Hines et al., 1995; Muszyński-Sulima, 2023; Podvig, 2002). Additionally, upgrades in communication technologies enabled more effective command and control of nuclear forces, making it possible to execute more complex strategies, such as launch-on-warning or flexible response scenarios (Erästö & Raju, 2023; FAS, 1985; Podvig, 2002). Ultimately, these advancements in satellite and radar systems increased Soviet confidence in their ability to detect surprise nuclear attacks, effectively conduct preemptive strikes in response to potential first strikes, and secure the leadership and assets needed for second strikes and warfighting. Early warning systems played a pivotal role in establishing a stable environment. These advancements likely led to a more relaxed doctrine regarding nuclear force readiness and posture (CIA, 1973; Erästö & Raju, 2023; FAS, 1985; Muszyński-Sulima, 2023). While the technological advancements of the 1970s and 1980s profoundly impacted Soviet nuclear doctrine, allowing for more flexible and sophisticated strategies, technology was only one factor in the evolution of their strategic options. 

Strategic arms control was a crucial topic of discussion between Washington and Moscow during the 1970s despite facing several challenges. During the decade, the two powers negotiated and implemented significant treaties to reduce the nuclear arms race. During the early 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union participated in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I). These negotiations led to two agreements between the two countries (DoS, 2023; NTI, 2011a; Schumann, 2022a). The Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms froze the number of ICBMs and SLBMs each side could deploy. (CACNP, 2022a; Schumann, 2022a). The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) also limited each side to two ABM sites. It aimed to prevent the large-scale deployment of ABM systems that could undermine the MAD principle (NTI, 2011a). The 1972 SALT I treaty and its follow-up agreements significantly affected the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons strategies. The restrictions placed on different missile systems forced the Soviet Union to concentrate on enhancing the quality of their existing weapons stockpiles and develop a doctrine that considered the reduced capabilities and newer innovations; this included developing MIRVs and improving the accuracy and reliability of their missile systems (CACNP, 2021; DoS, 2023; Sienkiewicz, 1978). 

The SALT II Treaty was signed by the Soviet Union and the United States in 1979 as a follow-up to the SALT I agreement. SALT II improved the previous treaty and included more stringent verification mechanisms, such as information on missile tests, to ensure better compliance with the treaty's terms. It aimed to impose stricter restrictions on strategic weapons, and its efforts sought to encourage greater nuclear parity between the two powers by establishing equal aggregate limits on specific categories of strategic systems (CRS, 2022; DoS, 2023; NTI, 2011b). 

After the SALT I agreement, the Soviet Union developed MIRVs to match the United States' strategic capabilities and to have the ability to launch preemptive counterforce attacks; however, MIRVs created instability by increasing the number of warheads in nuclear arsenals. In response, SALT II introduced limits on the number of MIRV-equipped ICBMs and SLBMs. Despite these measures, the Soviet Union focused on MIRV technology to ensure its missiles could overcome American ABM systems and have a credible second-strike capability (CACNP, 2021; Cameron, 2022; CRS, 2022; DoS, 2023; NTI, 2011b; Woolf, 2020). Although SALT II limited the number of strategic weapons, it allowed for modernization. Despite the treaty's constraints, the Soviet Union continued to improve the quality and sophistication of its arsenal (Cameron, 2022; Woolf, 2020). The SALT II agreement emphasized maintaining strategic stability through the balance of nuclear forces. The focus on parity and limitations resulted in refinements in Soviet doctrine, prioritizing survivability, second-strike capabilities, and diversification of their nuclear force by incorporating various delivery systems. Overall, the agreement's equal limits and greater comprehensiveness reinforced the importance of strategic stability (Cameron, 2022; Shoumikhin, 2011; Willson, 1984).

Soviet Era: 1980s

The 1980s marked a pivotal period in strategic arms control between the Soviet Union and the United States. Tensions escalated early in the decade but later led to significant diplomatic advances (CFR, 2023; Morra, 2022). For example, the INF Treaty of 1987 resulted in the elimination of a complete category of missiles. It obligated both the Soviet Union and the United States to destroy ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles that had ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (Kimball, 2019; AVC, 1987; CRS, 2022). Additionally, the 1980s saw the Soviet Union and the United States engaged in negotiations known as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START I). These talks aimed to significantly reduce the number of strategic offensive arms held by both countries. Although the first START I Treaty was not signed until 1991, the negotiations began during the 1980s (CACNP, 2022b; CFR, 2023; CRS, 2022).

Later in the 1980s, the Soviet doctrine became increasingly defensive and suggested that any nuclear war would be global and unsurvivable. This represented a significant shift from the previous versions of Soviet doctrine, which had believed that nuclear war was uncontrollable but winnable. This change in thinking likely encouraged the Soviets to remain committed to strategic arms negotiations (Adelman, 1986; CIA, 1973; Warner III, 1989; Scott, 1988; Shoumikhin, 2011). A significant influence on the doctrinal shifts of the last two decades of the Soviet Union was the ideology of the national leadership.  

National strategy and decision-making are heavily driven by specific leaders and bureaucratic structures (Allison, 1969). Soviet national leadership significantly influenced the formulation of its nuclear doctrine. Between 1970 and 1991, the doctrine of the Soviet Union was influenced by the ideologies and decision-making of four different leaders (Singh, 2023).  

In 1982, the last year of the Brezhnev era, the Soviet Union announced a no-first-use policy. However, it is worth noting that the Soviet military continued to discuss preemption as an option for defensive actions (CIA, 1983; Panda, 2018; Saxena, 2023). Some have viewed the declaration of a no-first-use policy as a political move, as it included language critical of the United States, pointing out that the United States and its nuclear-capable strategic partners had no such declaration and accused them of making first-strike the core of their nuclear doctrines (Schmemann, 1981, 1993). 

After the Brezhnev era ended, Yuri Andropov became the Soviet Union's next leader. Under the leadership of Yuri Andropov, the Soviets took a more proactive approach to strategic defense and overall preparedness, as Andropov was greatly concerned about the likelihood of a nuclear strike by the United States and had a significant lack of trust in the American leadership (Hoffman, 2015; Morra, 2022; Singh, 2023). During the Andropov years, the Soviet Union invested heavily in intelligence gathering, likely influenced in part by Andropov's background in espionage (Hoffman, 2015; Singh, 2023; Whitmore, 2009). Part of this intelligence-gathering effort was Project RYaN, an intelligence program to gather information that would provide warning of an impending nuclear first strike. The project primarily focused on monitoring a wide range of early-warning indicators that could suggest preparations for a nuclear first strike; this was a doctrinal priority (Schaefer et al., n.d.). Furthermore, during Andropov's brief leadership term, the Soviet Union considered preemptive first-strike strategies more seriously (Jones & Hoffman, 2021; Singh, 2023). The gravity of the situation was brought to light during the 1983 Able Archer event when Soviet leadership came dangerously close to deciding on a preemptive strike due to a misinterpretation of events (CIA, 1983; Jones & Hoffman, 2021; Hoffman, 2015; Morra, 2022). 

Following Andropov's death, Konstantin Chernenko assumed leadership. Chernenko's leadership was extremely short-lived, but during this time, the Soviet Union maintained defensive preemption as an advantageous component of its nuclear doctrine; ultimately, little was done to alter the existing Soviet nuclear doctrine. However, Chernenko's leadership led to a return to a foreign policy regime similar to that of the Brezhnev era (Singh, 2023). Chernenko worked to reduce tensions and engaged in nuclear weapon reduction negotiations with the United States (Bohlen, 1984). In the final years, the Soviet Union continued to advocate for strategic arms reductions and worked to reduce tensions under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, the final Soviet leader (Adelman, 1986; Timbie, 2022). 

Mikhail Gorbachev ascended to power during the height of Soviet nuclear armament; although arms control negotiations were ongoing, the Soviet nuclear stockpile reached its peak in the mid-1980s (CACNP, 2023; Timbie, 2022). Gorbachev's doctrine deemed nuclear parity non-essential for strategic deterrence, counterproductive to peace, and limited nuclear war unrealistic while being characteristically defensive (Balatsky & Wolkov, 2012; Karasik & Nichols, 1989; Scott, 1988). The Soviet doctrine under Gorbachev advocated for "reasonable sufficiency," moving away from the strategy of achieving nuclear parity with the United States. The aim was to maintain only as many nuclear weapons as necessary for deterrence. This was due, in part, to economic pressures and the realization that an uncontrolled arms race was unsustainable (Karasik & Nichols, 1989; Singh, 2023). Gorbachev sought to reduce tensions and adopt non-threatening behaviors, including a more moderate nuclear posture (Adelman, 1986; Timbie, 2022; Scott, 1988). Additionally, Gorbachev advocated for various arms control measures, including the elimination of entire classes of nuclear-armed and conventionally armed ballistic and cruise missiles, which aimed to increase global stability (Adelman, 1986; Timbie, 2022; Singh, 2023).

The Yeltsin Era

Boris Yeltsin's presidency, which followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union, was characterized by political instability, economic challenges, and a substantial decline in the country's military capabilities. These domestic challenges played a crucial role in shaping Russia's nuclear doctrine, which had to adapt to these new realities (Allison, 2012; Eyal, 2007; Singh, 2023; Steele, 2007). However, before Russia could develop a new doctrine during the Yeltsin era, it faced a significant challenge related to the dispersion of the Soviet nuclear arsenal across the former Soviet Republics that had become independent states (Allison, 2012). The collapse of the Soviet Union presented numerous challenges to nuclear security in the Yeltsin era, including the spread of nuclear weapons across newly independent states. Ensuring the safe transfer of these weapons to Russia required stringent security protocols to avoid mishaps or interceptions (Allison, 2012; Herspring, 2011). The Lisbon Protocol of 1992 and the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 were significant steps toward resolving security concerns (Pifer, 2019; Reif, 2022).

The Lisbon Protocol allowed Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to join the START I Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states, and they agreed to transfer all nuclear warheads to Russia for dismantlement (Reif, 2022). Additionally, the Budapest Memorandum focused on granting Ukraine security assurances against the use of force or economic coercion, and in exchange, Ukraine would give up the nuclear arsenal it had inherited from the Soviet Union, and Ukraine agreed to transfer all nuclear warheads to Russia and accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state (Pifer, 2019). From the Russian perspective, these efforts strengthened Russia's geopolitical position and security by ensuring that its neighbors, like Ukraine, would not possess significant numbers of nuclear weapons. Working to negotiate these diplomatic efforts also contributed to Russia's perception of its role as a key guarantor of stability (Allison, 2012; Gorenburg, 2019). Having additional nuclear-capable states on its border would have caused further strain during a time of military and economic weakness and would have needed to be addressed in any doctrine Russia developed. Ultimately, this issue was resolved in the early 1990s, and 1993, Russia released its first military doctrine of the Yeltsin era, outlining Russia's nuclear weapons policies (Allison, 2012; CRS, 2022; FAS, 1993; Goldman, 1997). 

It has been stated that in 1993, Russia abandoned the 1980s decree of no first use (CRS, 2022; Panda, 2018; Schmemann, 1981, 1993). However, Soviet strategy documents indicate that a preemptive first strike was firmly a component of doctrinal thought throughout the 1970s and 1980s (CIA, 1973, 1983; CRS, 2022; Sienkiewicz, 1978). The 1993 doctrine's language is mainly defensive and references the use of nuclear weapons in the context of threats to sovereignty, state integrity, strategic partners, and vital interests. Even in the context of a conventional strategic failure, the language indicates nuclear weapons could be used if the state is directly threatened (FAS, 1993; Schneider, 2006). Indeed, the 1993 doctrine does not reference a no-first-use policy. Still, it is likely that the Soviets never truly had a no-first-use policy, and the 1993 doctrine did not actually reject the principle but instead did not explicitly include the language. The apparent dichotomy is not between first-use and no-first-use, but instead in the framing of offensive and defensive nuclear action. The doctrines of the 1980s and 1993 indicate a willingness to engage in preemption, but the understanding is that this action would be defensive (CIA, 1973, 1983; FAS, 1993; Schmemann, 1993; Schneider, 2006). However, before Russia could develop a new doctrine, it faced one of the most significant nuclear weapons-related challenges: the reality that the Soviet Nuclear arsenal was dispersed across former Soviet Republics that had become independent states (Allison, 2012). 

Additionally, the 1993 doctrine asserted that Russia sought to continue working toward strategic arms limitations and nuclear testing (FAS, 1993). Although much like in the Detente era, geopolitical realities disrupt these goals (Balatsky & Wolkov, 2012; CRS, 2000; Danilov, 1999; McMahon, 2021). For example, the START II Treaty, signed in 1993, aimed to significantly reduce the number of deployed warheads to 3,000-3,500 per side compared to previous levels. START II aimed to build on the limitations set by START I. The treaty also called for the elimination of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Although the treaty was signed in 1993, the United States Senate did not ratify it until 1996, and the Russian Duma did not ratify it until 2000. However, the treaty ultimately collapsed due to geopolitical conditions, security concerns, and internal politics in the United States and the Russian Federation (Balatsky & Wolkov, 2012; CFR, 2023; CRS, 2022; Danilov, 1999; NTI, 2021). NATO actions in the Balkans and the alliance's expansion caused some distress in Moscow (Balatsky & Wolkov, 2012; Goldman, 1997). Russia perceived NATO's eastward expansion as a significant threat, and with a weakened conventional military, the only perceived actual deterrent was nuclear weapons. This situation compelled the Russian state to rely heavily on its strategic nuclear assets (CRS, 2022; Goldman, 1997). However, the reality was that the nuclear assets in their stockpile were rapidly aging, creating additional challenges for the Russian Federation.

The Russian strategic arms stockpile was rapidly aging, and the Russian economy needed to improve by the late 1990s and early 2000s. This was a critical situation for Russian policymakers and strategic planners alike. Investing in the modernization of the strategic arsenal to ensure parity even at reduced levels was a challenge and of great concern for military thinkers working to implement a doctrine still focused on strategic deterrence at a time when the conventional forces were in a state of debilitation and the economy was in crisis (CRS, 2000, 2022; Goldman, 1997; Steele, 2007). 

The new Russian state in the 1990s experienced great internal turmoil. Due to economic constraints and internal political crises, Russia's conventional military forces were significantly weakened, with nuclear weapons firmly securing the cornerstone of national security (Campbell, 2020; Eyal, 2007; FAS, 1993; Goldman, 1997; Singh, 2023; Steele, 2007). The Russian economy was in dire condition, and there were limited resources for military expenditures. This led to substantial reductions in conventional and nuclear capabilities due to arms control commitments, aging assets, and economic limitations. Despite the reductions, Russia worked to maintain a credible second-strike capability. Still, the focus shifted toward more cost-effective and survivable systems, such as road-mobile launch vehicles (Colby, 2016; Herspring, 2011; Singh, 2023; Sokov, 2007).

The economic conditions had a significant impact on Russia's entire nuclear triad. Ballistic missile submarines have always been a critical component of Russian deterrence doctrine. However, during the Yeltsin era, the Project 941 Akula and Project 667BDR Kalmar submarines were aging, and modernizing them proved difficult. In the mid-1990s, Russia unveiled the Project 955 Borei submarines; however, the project was subsequently paused due to economic constraints and other considerations. It took over a decade for the Project 955s to eventually enter service, leaving the Russian Federation with a small fleet of much older Soviet-era vessels (Arbatov, 2017; Herspring, 2011; Friedman, 1999; NTI, 2023b). Being unable to maintain a modern and robust fleet of strategic submarines properly was a significant shift from the Soviet era, which boasted a massive fleet. Many of those submarines were taken out of service or decommissioned after START I by or during the Yeltsin era (CACNP, 2022b; Herspring, 2011; Polmar, 2012; NTI, 2023b). 

The financial constraints of the 1990s prevented Russia from adequately modernizing its aging nuclear arsenal. This posed a challenge to its nuclear deterrence strategies outlined in its doctrine. Yeltsin's Russia found itself unable to invest in new weapons properly, placing greater emphasis on maintaining existing capabilities (CRS, 2000, 2022; Herspring, 2011; Goldman, 1997). The doctrine continued to shift towards relying on less advanced missiles but numerous cost-effective delivery systems capable of both non-strategic and strategic ballistic missile operations to maintain nuclear deterrence (Arbatov, 2017; CRS, 2022; Goldman, 1997; Singh, 2023). The decline in Russia's conventional capabilities made tactical nuclear weapons a more appealing option. While the 1993 doctrine appears to have allowed for the use of theater-level nuclear weapons, it still maintained that nuclear war would be a global war. While there were no major technological leaps during the Yeltsin years, the existing capabilities were integrated into the broader doctrine as a compensatory measure for conventional weaknesses (FAS, 1993; Goldman, 1997; Schneider, 2008; Whitehouse, 1999).

The Putin Era 

Since taking office in 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin has implemented significant changes in Russia's nuclear doctrine. Under his leadership, the doctrine has undergone several significant developments, including changes in the role of nuclear weapons in military strategy, a focus on technological modernization, and a decrease in the threshold for using nuclear weapons (CRS, 2022; Schneider, 2018; Singh, 2023). There has been a more unified approach, combining conventional and nuclear capabilities in strategic planning. This is evident in large-scale military exercises and recent nuclear drills conducted in the Barents Sea and on the Kamchatka Peninsula (Blank, 2011; CRS, 2022; Irwin, 2023). Russia has continued to modernize its nuclear arsenal, including developing new delivery systems, hypersonic missiles, and a nuclear-powered cruise missile (CRS, 2022; Singh, 2023). The rhetoric from the Kremlin suggests that Russia is more prepared than ever to use at least theater-level nuclear weapons in limited nuclear engagements (Associated Press, 2022; Faulconbridge, 2022; Peleschuk, 2023; Sky News, 2023). However, there is uncertainty over whether or not this seemingly more aggressive behavior is simply a performative or practicable component of Russian nuclear weapons doctrine treated with serious consideration (Associated Press, 2022; Colby, 2016; Giles et al., 2022; Talmazan, 2023). Nevertheless, Russia continues to pursue advanced weapon systems while working to ensure its nuclear capabilities remain credible, despite the erosion of the international arms control framework (Arbatov, 2020; Courtney & Klotz, 2023; CRS, 2022; Kaur, 2023; Lissner, 2021).

An Overview of the Doctrines in the Putin Era

In early 2000, Russia released its first military doctrine of the Putin era. The doctrine established a more proactive lower threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. The doctrine held that Russia was willing to use its nuclear capabilities as a response to any aggressive action, conventional or otherwise. Additionally, although asserting that it was a defensive doctrine, massive preemptive nuclear first strikes were considered a valid option to protect strategic assets and the state. The doctrine included the option of using nuclear weapons in regional conflicts, not just in large-scale global wars or to defend the country directly. This implies that tactical nuclear weapons may have a more significant role in Russia's military strategy. The doctrine also emphasized the integration of nuclear and conventional forces. This reflected an understanding that modern warfare would likely be a blend of both and that nuclear forces were to be seen as part of a continuum of strategic deterrence capabilities, signaling further importance of and reliance on its nuclear capabilities as part of its security strategies (Balatsky & Wolkov, 2012; CRS, 2022; Sokov, 1999). 

The 2010 doctrine explicitly identifies Russia's willingness to use nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional failure, conventional attack, on itself or allies, or an attack on itself or allies by any category of weapon of mass destruction. However, the doctrine stresses that the primary goal of Russia's nuclear weapons is the prevention of nuclear war and any other types of armed conflict and asserts that nuclear weapons will remain a critical component of Russian security planning. Overall, the 2000 and 2010 doctrines were quite similar (Balatsky & Wolkov, 2012; CRS, 2022; Russian Military Doctrine, 2010). 

In 2014, Russia made significant changes to its military doctrine, which expanded the range of scenarios in which the country would consider using nuclear weapons. Before this, in 2010, the military doctrine had already lowered the threshold for nuclear use, stating that Russia might use its nuclear arsenal to respond to the use of nuclear weapons against it or its allies. It could also utilize them in cases of aggression involving conventional weapons that threaten the state's very existence (Balatsky & Wolkov, 2012; CRS, 2022; Russian Military Doctrine, 2014).

The 2014 doctrine went a step further by highlighting the potential use of precision-guided conventional weapons as a strategic threat that could be met with a nuclear response. The doctrine also emphasized the importance of strategic deterrence, including nuclear deterrence, and the need to develop a 'mixed' nuclear delivery capability to engage various targets at different ranges. Additionally, it stressed the modernization of Russia's nuclear forces, underscoring the need for advanced nuclear delivery systems consistent with its ongoing strategic emphasis on nuclear triad modernization (CRS, 2022; Russian Military Doctrine, 2014).

Both the doctrine of 2010 and 2014 are part of a broader trend in Russian policy toward greater reliance on nuclear weapons in its national defense strategy. This trend has continued in subsequent years with the development of new types of nuclear delivery systems and warheads, such as hypersonic glide vehicles and low-yield nuclear weapons. Putin has recently stated that he sees no reason for a further change to Russia's nuclear doctrine; however, there has been an apparent increase in aggressive language that is part of their deterrence strategy at this vulnerable time with a weakened conventional force after the invasion of Ukraine (Balatsky & Wolkov, 2012; Binnendijk et al., 2022; CRS, 2022; Peleschuk, 2023; Russian Military Doctrine, 2010, 2014; Sky News, 2023).

In 2020, the Russian Federation released a new policy document regarding its nuclear deterrence strategies. The document emphasizes that Russia perceives nuclear weapons as a tool for deterrence only, aimed at safeguarding its territorial integrity and preventing aggression, whether it is nuclear or in other forms. The policy outlines the conditions under which Russia would consider using nuclear weapons, including in answering the use of weapons of mass destruction against Russia or its allies, or in case of a conventional attack that risks the existence of the state. The policy emphasizes that Russia is not interested in a nuclear arms race and that it is willing to engage in arms control agreements that lead to the reduction of nuclear arsenals as long as they are mutual and beneficial to all parties. Furthermore, the policy stresses the significance of maintaining strategic stability, reducing the risk of nuclear war, and preventing the escalation of military conflicts. The policy also acknowledges that non-nuclear means such as precision, information, and other forms of warfare can complement or replace nuclear capabilities in specific scenarios (CRS, 2022; Principles of Russian Nuclear Deterrence, 2020).

The policy document is highly detailed and clearly outlines Russia's nuclear deterrence policies. We no longer live in the same geopolitical environment in which this document was created, and as a result, reality may alter some of the positions outlined herein. Russia's actions in developing new technology, withdrawing from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and increasing its aggressive nuclear rhetoric mean that some sections of the policy document may no longer be in focus, such as avoiding an arms race and preventing the escalation of conflicts. However, the goal of and tools for deterrence remain effectively the same  (Binnendijk et al., 2022; CRS, 2022; Irwin, 2023; Peleschuk, 2023; Principles of Russian Nuclear Deterrence, 2020; Sky News, 2023; Talmazan, 2023).

Modernization in the Putin Era

The interaction between technology and doctrine is dynamic. New technologies come with new strategic possibilities, and doctrine requirements drive technological development. Likewise, technological progress can lead to an evolution in doctrinal thinking (Watts, 1996). In recent years, Russia has made significant advances in its nuclear capabilities thanks to innovations such as hypersonic missiles, the Sarmat ICBM, and the Burevestnik cruise missile (CRS, 2022). However, there are questions about Russia's ability to realize its ambitions of deploying these capabilities in the short term (Korda & Kristensen, 2023). Russia continues to invest in modernizing its nuclear triad—developing new ICBMs, SLBMs, cruise missiles, and other strategic nuclear weapons systems. New ICBMs like the RS-28 Sarmat and SLBMs like the RSM-56 Bulava have been developed, enhancing the credibility and flexibility of Russia's nuclear deterrent (Colby, 2016; CRS, 2022; CSIS, 2021c, 2021d). Novel systems such as the Poseidon nuclear torpedo and Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile provide Russia with additional options to deliver nuclear payloads, complicating adversary decision-making (Barrie & Boyd, 2021; Kaur, 2023; Sutton, 2022; Trevelyan, 2023). The Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle is designed to evade missile defense systems, enhancing Russia's second-strike capability. Developing hypersonic delivery systems, such as the Avangard and the Kinzhal, poses a direct challenge to existing missile defense systems. This technological leap has significant implications for Russian doctrine, potentially enabling it to bypass enemy defenses and carry out a successful first or second strike (Colby, 2016; CRS, 2022; CSIS, 2021a). These systems will replace the aging nuclear weapon systems currently making up the bulk of Russia's arsenal. Russia has made clear in the Putin era that Nuclear weapons are a vital component of its military doctrine, and the modernization of these systems is paramount to ensuring doctrinal requirements and strategic goals can be met and nuclear deterrence remains credible; these are all core tenets of Russia's nuclear weapons doctrine. Diversifying delivery systems and warhead types allows for more flexible escalation management in a conflict and makes the overall nuclear deterrent more credible (Colby, 2016; CRS, 2022; Kaur, 2023; Shoumikhin, 2011; Sokov, 2011).  

Furthermore, tactical nuclear weapons, designed for short-range and localized conflicts, reflect Russia's anticipation of various complex warfare scenarios. Advances in precision-guided munitions have enabled Russia to develop low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons with high accuracy, thereby increasing their credibility, utility as a deterrent, and geopolitical tool in Russia's so-called 'escalate to de-escalate’ strategy (Colby, 2016; Singh, 2023; Sokov, 2011). The advent of hypersonic missiles has added a threat layer to Russia's deterrent package, and other nuclear-capable tactical ballistic missile systems or dual function systems have been increasingly featured in Russian military exercises and doctrinal documents and suggests that there are now more potential scenarios in which these weapons could be employed (CRS, 2022; Faulconbridge, 2022, 2022b; Schneider, 2006; Singh, 2023; Sokov, 2011).

Arms Control Challenges in the Putin Era

When we consider the current state of Russia's nuclear weapons doctrine under President Vladimir Putin and its implications in the context of global geopolitical realities, it becomes apparent that the future of arms control and efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation is facing a challenging environment. With Russia upgrading its nuclear arsenal and adopting a more aggressive strategic stance, there are growing concerns about the stability and viability of arms control agreements (Arbatov, 2020; Courtney & Klotz, 2023; Kaur, 2023; Kazi & Singh, 2023; U.S. GAO, 2023; Wachs, 2022). In the Putin era, several critical arms control efforts have expired or otherwise eroded (Colby, 2016; CRS, 2022; Kaur, 2023; Shoumikhin, 2011; Sokov, 2011). Disagreements have arisen regarding missile defense systems, novel nuclear delivery systems like hypersonic missiles, and tactical nuclear weapons (CRS, 2022; NTI, 2023a; Pifer, 2021; Rumer, 2023).

Many arms control agreements, such as START I and START II, have been signed over the decades. However, the political climate has continued to evolve. New START was extended in 2021; however, it does not adequately reflect the broader complexities of Russia's evolving nuclear doctrine and capabilities, particularly in light of the emergence of new technologies. Russia has invested heavily in advanced technologies such as hypersonic missiles, nuclear-powered cruise missiles like the Burevestnik, and new heavy ICBMs like the RS-28, making arms control negotiations more complicated (Colby, 2016; CRS, 2022; Balatsky & Wolkov, 2012; Kaur, 2023; Shoumikhin, 2011). 

The New START treaty is a comprehensive agreement that includes thorough verification measures, such as on-site inspections and data exchanges. Its main objective is to limit the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 for each party while also limiting the number of deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers. This treaty has been one of the pillars of Russia-American strategic stability, providing predictability and transparency. It was extended in 2021 until 2026. However, New START has stalled due to geopolitical tensions over the war in Ukraine (NTI, 2023a; Pifer, 2021).

Russia's decision to withdraw from the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a significant setback for global efforts to control the production and proliferation of nuclear weapons. This move goes against the international norm that prohibits nuclear testing, which has been an essential cornerstone in the disarmament and non-proliferation efforts for decades. The withdrawal of Russia could even lead to a new arms race, as other nations may feel compelled to follow suit to maintain strategic parity or deterrence capabilities. This development challenges the fragile global arms control architecture, potentially impacting other treaties and agreements. The withdrawal further damages trust between nuclear powers, complicating diplomatic negotiations and cooperation on nuclear issues. In the future, this shift in Russia's approach could necessitate a reevaluation of arms control strategies by other nuclear states. Therefore, renewed diplomatic efforts are needed to address the evolving nuclear landscape and ensure global security (Osborn, 2023; Starchak, 2023).

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has complicated arms control due to Russia's assertive military posture, nuclear signaling, and the failure of its conventional forces, leaving it to fall back on nuclear weapons for deterrence and geopolitical leverage (CRS, 2022; Dreuzy & Gilli, 2022; Singh, 2023; Sky News, 2023). There are concerns about sparking a new global arms race as Russia updates its arsenal and adopts a confrontational posture, especially after the Ukraine crisis (Adamopoulos & Williams, 2022; Haass, 2022; Khatoon, 2023; Panda, 2023; Wachs, 2022). A worst-case scenario for Russo-American nuclear arms control in the wake of the Ukraine war involves a continued lack of interest from Russia in substantive arms control dialogue. This stance might be emboldened by their investments in new technologies and the belief that such capabilities offer a strategic edge, undermining the incentives for arms control (Arbatov, 2020; CRS, 2022; Lissner, 2021; NTI, 2023a; Pifer, 2021; U.S. GAO, 2023; Wachs, 2022). 

While not new, open lines of communication, transparency, and confidence-building measures are timeless tools in stabilizing relations (Arbatov, 2020; Gottemoeller, 2022, 2023; Lissner, 2021; Pifer, 2021; Rajaraman, 2023; U.S. GAO, 2023). However, these traditional diplomatic routes require at least some mutual respect for international norms and the global security architecture, which is absent from Russo-American diplomacy. Russia has been willing to defy norms in the current climate, as seen in its actions in Ukraine and its disregard for existing arms control agreements (Dreuzy & Gilli, 2022; Gottemoeller, 2022, 2023; Lebedev & Trevelyan, 2023; Peleschuk, 2023). This situation risks becoming a diplomatic stalemate, where Western powers engage in empty talk without meaningful progress, raising doubts about the effectiveness of traditional diplomacy (Courtney & Klotz, 2023; Gottemoeller, 2022; U.S. GAO, 2023; Wachs, 2022).

The involvement of China in arms control discussions with Russia is of strategic significance, given China's growing role in global geopolitics and its relationship with Russia. China has significant influence as a rising power and a key player in the Asia-Pacific region, which could help persuade Russia to re-engage in arms control dialogues. To achieve this goal, diplomatic efforts could focus on leveraging China's interests in regional stability and its aversion to an arms race that could destabilize its security and economy. One initiative could be to form trilateral dialogues that address the security concerns of all parties, creating a platform where China can act as a mediator or facilitator in discussions with Russia. Creating a more inclusive and effective arms control framework could be achieved by the international community if it integrates China's perspectives and acknowledges its role as a significant nuclear power. This approach could bring Russia back to the negotiation table and help build a more comprehensive and balanced global arms control regime. However, China has been hesitant to engage in three-way nuclear arms discussions while quietly pursuing further development of its own nuclear weapons plans. It may not be easy to work with China on these issues, but the United States should continue to engage with Moscow and China in hopes of some breakthrough (Adamopoulos & Williams, 2022; Einhorn, 2021; Gottemoeller, 2022; Logan, 2021; Melamed & Rusten, 2023; Schumann, 2023).

Final Thoughts

Russia's nuclear doctrine is shaped by a complex interplay of technological, geopolitical, and internal factors, much like the Soviet doctrine. The Soviet Union relied on massive retaliation and strategic parity for deterrence, whereas modern Russia favors a more adaptable approach. This includes focusing on tactical nuclear weapons, the proliferation of delivery systems, and implementing technological advancements (Balatsky & Wolkov, 2012; CRS, 2022; Goure, 1990; Singh, 2023; Wilson, 1984). Russia's nuclear posture has shifted from large nuclear stockpiles to one focused on modernization, flexibility, and technological innovation since the final years of the Soviet Union (Blank, 2011; CRS, 2022; Singh, 2023). Technological advancements, such as the development of hypersonic new heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), have led to shifts in missile defense and arms control considerations. Attempting to counter novel technologies through defensive technology, diplomacy, and modernization of arsenal has been a vital characteristic in the new era of strategic weapons (CRS, 2022). 

The expansion of NATO and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine are external factors that have had significant repercussions (Herspring, 2011; Singh, 2023). The Western response to Russia's actions, including the imposition of sanctions and increased NATO presence in Eastern Europe, and Russia's conventional military failures have reinforced Russia's reliance on nuclear weapons as deterrence and a counterbalance to conventional military hardships (Balatsky & Wolkov, 2012; Freeman & Sand, 2022; Garamone, 2022; Sethi, 2023; Shoumikhin, 2011; Wachs, 2022). Furthermore, Russia continues to prioritize the development of tactical nuclear weapons in this attempt to counterbalance its military weakness, particularly in localized conflicts; these low-yield warheads made an even more potent option with the advent of hypersonics (Colby, 2016; CRS, 2022; Singh, 2023; Sokov, 2011). Technological advancements and modernization have become central to doctrinal development. Russia aims for greater flexibility in tailoring its nuclear response capabilities to diverse threats and scenarios. Therefore, the doctrine can be seen as a dynamic construct intricately tied to Russia's evolving strategic culture, reflecting the geostrategic environment and its changing technological capabilities (Colby, 2016; Balatsky & Wolkov, 2012; CRS, 2022; Kaur, 2023). 

Arms control negotiations have become more complex due to modern technology and Russia's evolving nuclear strategy and geostrategic reality, making arms control agreements increasingly misaligned with Russia's doctrinal scope and deterrence needs (Courtney & Klotz, 2023; CRS, 2022; Pifer, 2021; Nikitin & Oznobishchev, 2008; Rajaraman, 2023). This reality heightens the stakes, as failure to adapt could trigger nuclear competition and undermine progress in arms control (Courtney & Klotz, 2023; Gottemoeller, 2022).

Comprehensive agreements are necessary to address contemporary weapon systems and the emergence of new technologies. Compromise will be essential in these discussions, as the Russian Federation and the United States bear a significant responsibility to lead efforts in nuclear arms control. These agreements should encompass both strategic weapon systems and the spread of low-yield tactical devices. Simply reducing strategic weapons might shift the focus toward developing tactical nuclear weapons to maintain deterrence capabilities (Arbatov, 2020; U.S. GAO, 2023). 

Arms control frameworks are eroding at an alarming rate. Engaging with Russia and China on strategic arms control issues is increasingly challenging. Any hope of slowing the decay of decades of work will hinge on firm commitments and states engaging in good-faith trust-building efforts. The United States and its strategic partners must engage with hesitant, combative, or otherwise dissentious nuclear powers through creative approaches (Gottemoeller, 2022, 2023; U.S. GAO, 2023). Moscow and Beijing are often more respectful of 1.5 or 2 diplomacy tracks, especially in the current geopolitical environment (Bender, 2022; Manley, 2023; Gottemoeller, 2023; Siracusa, 2023).

Lastly, this research has raised significant questions about past and present interpretations of Russian nuclear weapons policies outlined in their military doctrines. Many articles reference dramatic shifts in policies from declaring no-first-use to rejecting such a policy to only targeting non-nuclear states if they are in an alliance with a nuclear power aggressor. However, there are only subtle changes in the language used while keeping the actionable policy effectively the same. These analyses are likely encouraged by a desire to understand Russian intentions, and Moscow at least partly formulates language around that desire, aiming to sow uncertainty and speculation. This underscores the need for further research on the linguistic constructions of military doctrines, as it is a crucial aspect of arms control (Balatsky & Wolkov, 2012; CRS, 2022; FAS, 1993; Roberts, 2020; Russian Military Doctrine, 2010, 2014; Schmemann, 1993; Schneider, 2006; Sokov, 1999). 

Future research should investigate the nuances of changes in policy language within military doctrines to understand better the linguistic constructions and the reasons behind the language's appearance. The specific language of military doctrines can be and is used as part of the overall deterrence strategies as a means to influence perceptions or generate misconceptions; thus, it can be reasoned that the subtle shifts in details and vagueness serve a strategic purpose and might not indicate a significant change in actionable policy. By signaling specific capabilities or intentions through doctrinal statements, a nation can create ambiguity, induce caution, or deter aggressive actions by its adversaries. The potential impact of language in official documents and public commentary on strategic calculations is significant, as it can complicate an adversary's decision-making processes and strategic calculations, underscoring the gravity of the situation (Mazarr, 2018; Roberts, 2020; Schmemann, 1993; Vidal, 2023).

Additionally, further research should also be done on how to facilitate healthy trilateral efforts on strategic arms control that involve China, Russia, and the United States (Gottemoeller, 2022; Logan, 2021; Melamed & Rusten, 2023; Schumann, 2023).

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